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KAHN v. VIRGINIA RETIREMENT SYSTEM: THE IMPACT OF RULE
lOb-5'S CORPORATE DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS ON THE
WILLIAMS ACT'S TENDER OFFER AND BEST PRICE RULES.
I. INTRODUCTION
Today, corporate management must often address questions of when
to disclose large corporate transactions.' In many situations, the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934 provides answers by requiring mandatory disclo-
sure to protect investors2 and promote the efficiency of the stock market
by eliminating fraud.3 Specifically, Rule 10b-5, promulgated by the Securi-
ties Exchange Commission (SEC), prohibits corporations from making
misleading statements and omissions of material fact regarding the
1. Dawn Callaway, The Duty to Disclose v. The Duty Not to Mislead During Merger
Negotiations, 23 WAKE FoREST L. Rv. 143, 144 (1988) (discussing difficulties corpo-
rations face when deciding whether or not to disclose merger negotiations). Cal-
laway argues that this dilemma stems from the multiple disclosure requirements
imposed on corporations. Id. Such requirements include federal securities laws,
stock exchange rules and state law fiduciary duties imposed on corporate manage-
ment. Id. When interpreting whether a corporation has complied with these re-
quirements, the courts must acknowledge the adverse consequences that may
result from premature disclosure. Id. Primarily, the courts' concern with prema-
ture disclosure is that rival bidders might cause the price of the security to rise,
thus reducing the willingness of many firms to enter into merger negotiations and
inducing others to lower their initial offering price. Id. However, the market price
may still rise, due to speculation that the disclosure will attract rival bidders. Id. If
the stock price does rise, many acquiring firms may terminate the merger negotia-
tions, resulting in the shareholders' loss of valuable merger premiums. Id. (citing
Staffin v. Greenberg, 672 F.2d 1196, 1206 (3d Cir. 1982)) (arguing that public
disclosure of preliminary merger discussions may actually harm more than help
stockholders because disclosure often causes stock price to rise toward expected
tender price).
2. C. Daniel Ewell, Rule 10b-5 and the Duty to Disclose Merger Negotiations in Cor-
porate Statements, 96 YALE L.J. 547, 548 (1987); see, e.g., Nicholas Wolfson & Thomas
A. Russo, The Stock Exchange Member: Liability for Violation of Stock Exchange Rules, 58
CAL. L. REv. 1120, 1147 (1970) (stating that 1934 Act refers to investor protection
goal 50 separate times).
3. Ewell, supra note 2, at 548; see, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 2-
3 (1933) (noting that securities markets are "nation's primary mechanism for allo-
cating economic resources among competing companies"); Irwin Friend, The SEC
and the Economic Performance of Securities Markets, in ECONOMIC POLICY AND THE REGU-
LATION OF CORPORATE SECURITIEs 190 (H. Manne ed., 1969) (stating that "alloca-
tional efficiency has been regarded as the most important economic function" of
securities markets); Thomas J. Schoenbaum, The Relationship Between Corporate Dis-
closure and Corporate Responsibility, 40 Fo.niHAm L. REv. 565, 577 (1972) (stating that
free and open securities markets also improve allocative efficiency of capital mar-
kets); see also Note, The Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis, Economic Theoiy and the
Regulation of the Securities Industry, 29 STAN. L. REv. 1031, 1032 (1977) (noting that
one purpose of Securities Acts was to improve market's economic functions,
thereby improving resource allocation).
(263)
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purchase or sale of securities. 4 Nevertheless, despite the pro-disclosure
philosophy of Rule lOb-5, the Rule does not impose a general obligation
for complete disclosure of all information until a specific duty to disclose
arises. 5
4. Ewell, supra note 2, at 549. Rule 10b-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of
any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in
the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not mislead-
ing, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which oper-
ates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connec-
tion with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1986). See generally ARNOLD JACOBS, Litigation and Practice
Under Rule lOb-5, in 5 SECURrrIEs LAw SERIES (2nd ed. 1981) (discussing Rule lOb-5
and its judicial application).
5. Yolanda E. Stefanou, Basic Inc. v. Levinson: The Disclosure of Preliminay
Merger Discussions Within the Context of Rule lOb-5, 3 ADMIN. L.J. 465, 487 (1989)
(discussing argument that silence is not "misleading" absent clear duty to disclose).
In TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976), the United States
Supreme Court established a materiality standard to determine when a duty to
disclose arises based on whether a substantial likelihood exists that disclosure
would be significant to a reasonable investor. TSC Industries 426 U.S. at 449. How-
ever, in Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988), the United States Supreme
Court explained that "[t] he application of [the TSC Industries] materiality standard
to preliminary merger discussions is not self evident" because a merger's possibility
is itself "contingent or speculative in nature." Basic Inc., 485 U.S. at 232. Neverthe-
less, the Basic Inc. Court expressly adopted the TSC Industries materiality standard
for Rule lOb-5 analysis. Id.
For a discussion of cases holding that no duty of continuous disclosure exists
under Rule lOb-5 absent insider trading or exigent circumstances, see Staffin v.
Greenburg, 672 F.2d 1196, 1205 (3d Cir. 1982) (holding that stockholder acquir-
ing interest in company had no pre-acquisition duty to disclose information re-
garding struggle for corporate control); Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d
271, 299 (7th Cir. 1981) (noting timing of release of corporate information should
be based on business judgment of issuer); SEC v. Geon Indus., Inc., 531 F.2d 39, 48
(2d Cir. 1976) (noting difference in materiality, standard for inside information as
compared to inaccurate information); Financial Indus. Fund v. McDonnell Doug-
las Corp., 474 F.2d 514, 519 (10th Cir.) (stating duty to disclose does not com-
mence until information is "available and ripe for publication") (citing Mitchell v.
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 874
(1973); Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937, 949
(2d Cir. 1969) (stating that "[w]hile a company may choose to correct a misstate-
ment in the press not attributable to it... we find nothing in the securities legisla-
tion requiring it to do so"); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 850 n.12
(2d Cir. 1968) (noting that "the timing of disclosure is a matter for the business
judgement of the corporate officers entrusted with the management of the corpo-
ration within the affirmative disclosure requirements promulgated by the ex-
changes and by the SEC").
Commentators have also addressed the duty to disclose issue. See Donald M.
Feuerstein, The Corporation's Obligations of Disclosure Under the Federal Securities Laws
When It Is Not Trading in Its Stock, 15 N.Y.L.F. 385, 391-92 (1969) (discussing Texas
Gulf Sulphur and duty to disclose); John M. Sheffey, Securities Law Responsibilities of
2
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In establishing a corporation's duty to disclose a transaction, the en-
tity must first determine whether the transaction is material. 6 The United
States Supreme Court has articulated a fact-intensive inquiry for determin-
ing the materiality of merger negotiations. 7 Based on the speculative na-
ture of preliminary merger negotiations, assessing the significance of the
information involves weighing both the indicated probability the event will
occur and the anticipated magnitude of the transaction in light of the
totality of company activity.8 When disclosing information to the public
concerning significant transactions, a corporation must also consider the
Issuers to Respond to Rumors and Other Publicity: Reexamination of a Continuing Problem,
57 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 755, 760-70 (1982) (arguing that express duty to disclose
does not exist). The SEC encourages prompt announcement of material corpo-
rate information, but has never imposed such a disclosure requirement. See SEC
Comment on Timely Disclosure of Material Corporate Developments, Exchange
Act Release No. 8995, [1970-71 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
1 77,915, at 80,035 (Oct. 15, 1970) (stating that except when corporate insiders
trade in corporate stock, no mandatory immediate disclosure is required).
6. Basic Inc., 485 U.S. at 239 & n.17. Absent three special circumstances, a
firm retains no duty to disclose preliminary merger negotiations. Callaway, supra
note 1, at 147. This commentator suggests that "[a]lthough information concern-
ing merger possibilities is clearly material under the TSC [Industries] 'reasonable
investor' standard, the same considerations that have justified what is, in effect, a
public policy exception to the TSC [Industries] test in other merger nondisclosure
cases support a finding of immateriality in this instance." Id. at 146 n.31 (quoting
Note, Rule 1Ob-5 and the Duty to Disclose Merger Negotiations in Corporate Statements, 96
YALE L.J. 547, 563-64 (1987)) (citing Reiss v. Pan Am World Airways, Inc., 711 F.2d
11 (2d Cir. 1983)). When the merger negotiations involve trading by issuers or
insiders of the corporation, the negotiations must be disclosed. Id. at 147 (citing
Greenfield v. Hueblein, 742 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1984)). Similarly, a leak of informa-
tion by the issuer mandates disclosure. Id. Finally, an issuer's earlier statement
that has subsequently become misleading since its issuance requires disclosure. Id.
(citing Ross v. A.H. Robins Co., 465 F. Supp. 904 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other grounds,
607 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 946 (1980)).
7. Basic Inc., 485 U.S. at 230. The Court refused to endorse a bright line rule,
such as the "agreement in principle" test. Id. at 236. "Any approach that
designates a single fact or occurrence as always determinative of an inherently fact-
specific finding such as materiality, must necessarily be overinclusive or underin-
clusive." Id. The Court noted that materiality depends on the significance a rea-
sonable investor would place on the particular information in deciding how to
vote. Id. (citing TSC Indus., 426 U.S. at 450).
If the impact of the corporate development is certain, the TSC Industries appli-
cation is straightforward. Id. at 232. Conversely, when the event is contingent, like
merger negotiations, application of the "reasonable investor" test is more difficult.
Id. However, the Court did not address other kinds of contingent or speculative
information, such as earnings, forecasts or projections. Id. at 232 n.9.
8. Id. at 238 (citing SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir.
1968) (en banc)). The Basic Inc. Court stated that "no particular event or factor
short of closing the transaction need be either necessary or sufficient by itself to
render merger discussions material." Id. at 239. However, silence without a duty
to disclose is not misleading under Rule 10b-5. Id. at 239 n.17. "No comment"
statements are generally considered the same as silence. Id. (citing In re Carnation
Co., Exchange Act Release No. 22,214, 33 S.E.C. Docket 1025 (1985)).
3
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dictates of the Williams Act.9 Although the Williams Act primarily con-
cerns tender offers made by a bidder, 10 a public pre-tender announce-
ment may also trigger mandatory disclosures under the Act." Section
14(d) outlines the Williams Act disclosure requirements.1 2
In Kahn v. Virginia Retirement System, 13 the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Fourth Circuit examined this materiality requirement for
other contingent corporate developments. 14 Specifically, the Fourth Cir-
cuit addressed the issue of interpreting a corporate disclosure in light of
conflicting SEC regulations.1 5 The Kahn court found that the negotia-
tions at issue concerned matters significant to a reasonable investor's trad-
ing decision. 16 Thus, the Kahn court concluded that a Rule 10b-5
9. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1994). Congress enacted the Wil-
liams Act amendments to regulate the increased use of cash tender offers in corpo-
rate takeovers. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 22 (1976). Prior to the
Williams Act, cash tender offers were not subject to the disclosure requirements of
the federal securities laws. Id. Congress believed that shareholders needed more
complete disclosure from tender offer bidders to make an informed decision
whether to tender their shares. See generally S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 2
(1967) (stating "[t] he competence and integrity of a company's management, and
of the persons who seek management positions, are of vital importance to the
stockholders"); H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-4 (requiring disclosure
of pertinent information to stockholders in "takeover bid" or repurchase of equity
securities). For a detailed discussion of the Williams Act requirements, see infra
note 27 and accompanying text.
10. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (1). "It shall be unlawful for any person. . . to make a
tender offer for ... any class of any equity security . . . if, after consummation
thereof, such person would, directly or indirectly, be the beneficial owner of more
than [five] per centum of such class ...." Id. However, neither Congress nor the
SEC has expressly defined a tender offer. Telvest, Inc. v. Bradshaw, 618 F.2d 1029,
1032 (4th Cir. 1980). For a discussion of the various judicial tests, including the
"Eight Factor" test, see infra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
11. See Adoption of Amendments to Tender Offer Rules, Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 16,384, [1979-80 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 82,373, at
82,577 (Nov. 29, 1979) [hereinafter Release 16,384]; 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-2 (1979).
Rule 14d-2 states that the issuance of a "public announcement by a bidder ... with
respect to a tender offer. . . shall be deemed to constitute the commencement of
a tender offer" thereby triggering the Williams Act. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-2(b).
12. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1). To commence a tender offer, the public an-
nouncement must contain "(1) The identity of the bidder; (2) The identity of the
subject company; and (3) The amount and class of securities being sought and the
price or range of prices being offered therefor." 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-2(c).
Once the tender offer begins, the bidder has five days to comply with the
filing requirements of the Williams Act or to delay the tender offer. 17 C.F.R.
240.14d-2(b) (1)-(2). If the bidder does not act, the tender offer will be deemed
commenced on the public announcement date and bidder will have violated filing
and disclosure requirements. Release 16,384, supra note 11.
13. 13 F.3d 110 (4th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1834 (1994).
14. See id. (analyzing Basic Inc. standard as it relates to corporate
restructuring).
15. For a discussion of conflict between SEC requirements, see infra notes 33-
36 and accompanying text.
16. For a detailed discussion of the three way transaction, see infra notes 106-
08 and accompanying text.
266
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disclosure should not be treated as a tender offer made by or on behalf of
the bidder.17
This Note examines the difficulties courts face in determining when
general business developments must be disclosed under Rule 10b-5 de-
spite the ramifications of the Williams Act.1 8 Section II details the Wil-
liams Act, its disclosure requirements, and the judicial definition of a
tender offer.1 9 In addition, Section II investigates the Supreme Court's
landmark decision concerning materiality and timing of disclosure in Basic
Inc. v. Levinson.20 Finally, this Section examines how federal courts have
applied the Basic Inc. decision to alleged omissions relating to merger ne-
gotiations.2 1 Section III presents the facts of Kahn and discusses this
Fourth Circuit opinion.2 2 Section IV suggests that the Fourth Circuit, in
expanding the subject corporation's Rule 10b-5 mandatory disclosure re-
quirements under Basic Inc., failed to engage in the appropriate fact-inten-
sive inquiry regarding the materiality of the press release.23 Section V
considers the potential impact that the Fourth Circuit's decision will have
on future cases involving the materiality of contingent corporate
developments. 24
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Williams Act
Prior to the 1960s, the traditional means for corporate takeover at-
tempts was an exchange offer of securities or a proxy solicitation. 25 In
17. For a discussion of the Fourth Circuit decision, see infra notes 117-43 and
accompanying text.
18. For a discussion of the fact-intensive nature of the analysis, see infra notes
138-43 and accompanying text.
19. For a detailed discussion of the Williams Act and tender offers, see infra
notes 25-44 and accompanying text.
20. 485 U.S. 224 (1988). For a detailed discussion of the Supreme Court's
decision and rationale in Basic Inc., see infra notes 63-73 and accompanying text.
21. For a detailed discussion of the application of Basic Inc. by the lower fed-
eral courts, see infra notes 74-94 and accompanying text.
22. For a discussion of the facts of the shareholder derivative suit underlying
the Kahn opinion, see infra notes 96-116 and accompanying text. For a discussion
of the Fourth Circuit opinion, see infra notes 117-43 and accompanying text.
23. For a critical analysis of the Fourth Circuit's opinion, see infra notes 144-
65 and accompanying text.
24. For a discussion of the possible impact on various corporate entities from
the Fourth Circuit's opinion, see infra notes 166-68 and accompanying text.
25. Piper v. Chris Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 22 (1976). The proliferation of
cash tender offers as devices for securing corporate control is analyzed in detail in
Samuel L. Hayes & Russell A. Taussig, Tactics of Cash Takeover Bids, 45 HARv. Bus.
REv. 135 (Mar. - Apr. 1967). An exchange offer refers to that part of a bilateral
contract that includes the consideration for the ultimate contract when the offer is
accepted. BLACK's LAw DICTioNARY 563 (6th ed. 1990). Solicitations include "any
other writings which are part of a continuous plan ending in solicitation and
[which] prepare the way for its success." SEC v. Okin, 132 F.2d 784, 786 (2d Cir.
1943).
1995] NOTE
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response to the proliferation of cash tender offers to effectuate corporate
takeovers, Congress passed the Williams Act in 1968.26 The Williams Act
protects shareholders by ensuring the disclosure of adequate information
about the terms and implications of the tender offer before deciding to
sell or retain their shares. 2 7
Under the Williams Act, the key to investor protection involves inter-
preting the ambiguous term "tender offer."28 Interpreting "tender offer"
remains particularly problematic when a company makes a public an-
nouncement of a tender offer's material terms before the tender offer be-
gins.2 9  These announcements may cause shareholders to make
investment decisions regarding a tender offer with incomplete informa-
26. Piper, 430 U.S. at 22. Such offers were then outside the reach of existing
federal securities disclosure requirements. Id. Proxy solicitations were regulated
under section 14 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, and exchange offers
were subject to the registration requirements of section 77 e of the 1933 Securities
and Exchange Act. Id. In response to this perceived gap in existing legislation,
Senator Harrison Williams introduced a bill in 1965 to subject cash tender offerors
to advance disclosure requirements. Id. For a detailed discussion of the disclosure
requirements of the Williams Act, see infra note 27.
27. Id. at 35. The Williams Act requires takeover bidders to file a statement
indicating the identity and background of the offeror, the source and amount of
consideration used to make the purchase, the offeror's holdings in the target cor-
poration, and offeror's plans regarding the structure of the target corporation. 15
U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1) (1994). Additionally, the Act provides three benefits for those
who elect to tender their stock. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5)-(7). First, stockholders ac-
cepting tender offers may withdraw during the first seven days of the tender offer
and at any time after 60 days from the commencement of the offer. 15 U.S.C.
§ 78n (d) (5). Second, when less than all outstanding shares are offered and more
than the requested number of shares are tendered, the tendered securities must
be accepted pro rata by the offeror during the first six months of the offer. 15
U.S.C. § 78n(d) (6). Finally, if during the tender offer period, the amount paid for
the target shares is increased, all tendering shareholders are to receive the addi-
tional consideration. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (7). The Williams Act also contains a
broad anti-fraud prohibition, which states in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person to make any untrue statement of a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of
the circumstances under which they are made, not misleading, or to en-
gage in any fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts or practices, in
connection with any tender offer or request for invitation for tenders, or
any solicitation of security holders in opposition to or in favor of any such
offer, request, or invitation.
15 U.S.C. 78n(e).
28. Kahn v. Virginia Retirement Sys., 13 F.3d 110, 114 (4th Cir. 1993), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 1834 (1994). A conventional tender offer is a public invitation to
"all shareholders of a corporation to tender their shares for sale at a specified
price." Note, The Developing Meaning of "Tender Offer" Under the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1250, 1251 (1973). The conventional tender offer
typically remains open for two weeks at a premium over market price. Id. at 1251-
52. For a discussion of non-conventional tender offers, see infra notes 35-36 and
accompanying text.
29. Kahn, 13 F.3d at 114. "Such pre-commencement public announcements
cause security holders to make investment decisions with respect to a tender offer
on the basis of incomplete information and trigger market activity normally at-
tendant to a tender offer, such as arbitrageur activity." Kahn v. Virginia Retire-
268
6
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 1 [1995], Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol40/iss1/6
1995] NOTE
tion.30 To reduce such pre-tender offer announcements and to prevent
inadvertent tender offers, the SEC promulgated Rules 14d-2(b)3 1 and 14d-
2(c).32
Courts have fashioned several tests in determining whether a party's
actions constitute a tender offer for purposes of the Williams Act.33
A conventional tender offer consists of a public invitation, "to all share-
holders of a corporation, to tender their shares for sale at a specific
price."3 4 If a securities transaction does not meet this traditional defi-
nition, some courts use an "Eight Factor" test to determine if the trans-
action is a tender offer.3 5 Another more flexible judicial test involves
ment Sys., 783 F. Supp. 266, 271 (E.D. Va. 1992) (quoting language in Release
16,384, supra note 11, at 82,582-83).
30. See Release 16,384, supra note 11, at 82,582 (attempting to clarify when
tender offer begins). These "pre-commencement public announcements cause
the contest for control of the subject company to occur prior to the application of
the Williams Act and therefore deny security holders the protections which that
Act was intended by Congress to provide." Id. at 82,583.
31. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-2(b). Under Rule 14d-2(b), a bidder's public an-
nouncement of the material terms of a cash tender offer, through a press release,
newspaper advertisement or public statement triggers the tender offer rules under
section 14(d) of the Exchange Act. Release 16,384 supra note 11, at 82,583.
32. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-2(b). To provide certainty to bidders, the informa-
tion which triggers Rule 14d-2(b) is specified in 14d-2(c). Release 16,384, supra
note 11, at 82,583. For a detailed discussion of these particular disclosure require-
ments, see supra note 12.
33. Weeden v. Continental Health Affiliates, Inc., 713 F. Supp. 396, 402 (N.D.
Ga. 1989). The courts were "apparently concerned that methods of acquisition
representing deviations from the conventional tender offer but exerting similar
deleterious effect on shareholders could be resorted to in circumvention of the
regulatory process . .. ." Id. For a discussion of the "Eight Factor" test and the
totality of circumstances test, see infra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
34. Weeden 713 F. Supp. at 402 (quoting Note, supra note 28, at 1251).
"[T]he SEC has consistently refused to supply a definition since the dynamic na-
ture of tender offers demands judicial flexibility in determining what kinds of ac-
quisitions should be subject to the Act." Id. at 401 (citing Pin v. Texaco Inc., 793
F.2d 1448, 1453 (5th Cir. 1986)).
35. American Carriers Inc. v. Baytree Investors, Inc., 685 F. Supp. 800, 809 (D.
Kan. 1988). The court in Weeden also noted:
Congress left the SEC with the task of providing concrete meaning to the
term tender offer. The SEC has never articulated a precise test but has,
on several occasions, provided courts with a list of seven or eight factors
that its [sic] considers relevant to the determination of whether a given
transaction constitutes a tender offer for Williams Act purposes.
Weeden, 713 F. Supp. at 402 n.5. The following eight factors have been considered
when determining whether a tender offer has been made:
(1) [a]ctive and widespread solicitation of public shareholders for the
shares of an issuer;
(2) solicitation made for a substantial percentage of the issuer's stock;
(3) offer to purchase made at a premium over the prevailing market
price;
(4) terms of the offer are firm rather than negotiable;
(5) offer contingent on the tender of a fixed number of shares, often
subject to a fixed maximum number to be purchased;
(6) offer open only for a limited period of time;
7
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considering the transaction in light of the totality of corporate circum-
stances.
36
In Weeden v. Continental Health Affiliates, Inc.,3 7 the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of Georgia reached the same result by
applying both the "Eight Factor" test and the totality of circumstances test
to a potential tender offer.3 8 In Weeden, the bidder sent a letter to the
subject company's board of directors seeking to negotiate an acquisition
of common stock at $6.00 per share. 39 Because the letter only met two
prongs of the "Eight Factor" test, the district court concluded that the
bidder's letter did not constitute a tender offer.40 The court also held that
(7) offeree subjected to pressure to sell his stock;
(8) public announcements of a purchasing program concerning the tar-
get company precede or accompany rapid accumulation of a large
amount of target company's securities.
Id. at 402 (citing Zuckerman v. Franz, 573 F. Supp. 351, 358 (S.D. Fla. 1983). See
generally Wellman v. Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. 783 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (using "Eight
Factor" test to determine if public announcement resulted in tender offer); Bras-
can Ltd. v. Edper Equities Ltd., 477 F. Supp. 773 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (same).
36. Hanson Trust PLC v. SCM Corp., 774 F.2d 47, 57 (2d Cir. 1985). The
Second Circuit described this more flexible test:
[T]he question of whether a solicitation constitutes a "tender offer"
within the meaning of [section] 14(d) turns on whether, viewing the
transaction in the light of the totality of circumstances, there appears to
be a likelihood that unless the pre-acquisition filing strictures of that stat-
ute are followed there will be a substantial risk that solicitees will lack the
information needed to make a carefully considered appraisal of the pro-
posal put before them.
Id. For examples of the application of this totality of circumstances test, see FMC
Corp. v. Boesky, 727 F. Supp. 1182, 1198-99 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (using totality of cir-
cumstances test in recapitalization and change in corporate structure); Weeden, 713
F. Supp. at 403 (applying totality of circumstances test for proposal to purchase all
outstanding common stock); In re General Motors Class E Stock Buyout Sec. Litig.,
694 F. Supp. 1119, 1130-31 (D. Del. 1988) (applying totality of circumstances test
to buyout of one shareholder's securities). American Carriers, Inc. v. Baytree In-
vestors, Inc., 685 F. Supp. 800, 809 (D. Kan. 1988) (applying totality of circum-
stances test to tender offer of 51% of stock).
37. 713 F. Supp. 396 (N.D. Ga. 1989).
38. Id. at 403. The tender offer falls outside the classical definition because
the offer was a letter to the board, no fixed time limit was given and no pressure
was exerted on the shareholders to sell their stock. See id. at 397.
39. Id. On September 7, 1988, the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of Conti-
nental issued a press release stating the terms in the letter to the Board of Direc-
tors. Id. Both the letter and press release stated that financing or further review of
the business would not preclude the offer. Id. Additionally, on September 7,
1988, Continental filed a Schedule 13D, disclosing its purchase of 6.9% of
Healthdyne, the target corporation, common stock and its intention to gain con-
trol of the company by acquiring all of its outstanding stock. Id.
40. Id. at 402. The court found that Continental's proposal satisfied the sec-
ond and third prong of the test. Id. Continental's proposal met the second factor,
solicitation made for a substantial percentage of the issuer's stock, because it in-
cluded all outstanding shares of common stock. Id. Additionally, Continental met
the third prong, offer to purchase made at a premium over the prevailing market
price, because the $6.00 per share price included a premium over market. Id.
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applying the totality of circumstances test to the bidder's letter would not
change the "no tender offer" result.
41
Subsequently, in Exchange Act Release 34-16623, the SEC clarified
certain confusion surrounding the tender offer rules. 42 The SEC stated
that a Rule 14d-2 tender offer will only commence via a public announce-
ment by the bidder or on the bidder's behalf.43 The SEC also emphasized
that when the bidder's intentions become public, any affirmation of Rule
14d-2 (c) information, by or on behalf of the bidder, starts the tender offer
period.44
B. "Best Price Rule"
The SEC designed the "Best Price Rule" of the Williams Act to pre-
vent a tender offeror from discriminating among tendering sharehold-
ers.45 The SEC further specified that a tender offer must extend to all
41. Id. at 403. The Continental proposal does not indicate that shareholders
lacked vital information concerning the proposed acquisition or that they were
pressured into making uninformed decisions regarding their stock. Id.
42. Kahn v. Virginia Retirement Sys., 13 F.3d 110, 115 (4th Cir. 1993), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 1834 (1994) (citing Interpretative Release Relating to Tender
Offer Rules, Exchange Act Release 34-16,623, 3 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 24,2841
(March 5, 1980)). The Interpretative Release discusses questions relating to events
causing the commencement of a tender offer, the adequacy of the dissemination
of the offer and the time period which the offer is open. Id. (citing Interpretative
Release Relating to Tender Offer Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 34-16,623, 3
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 24,2841 (March 5, 1980)). The release addresses these
areas because compliance with these rules has been difficult. Id. (citing Interpreta-
tive Release Relating to Tender Offer Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 34-16,623,
3 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 24,2841 (March 5, 1980)).
43. Id. (citing Interpretative Release Relating to Tender Offer Rules, Ex-
change Act Release No. 34-16,623 [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
1 24,2841 (March 5, 1980)). The Interpretive Release states, in pertinent part:
In certain situations where the bidder and subject company agree or ar-
range that the subject company will make the public announcement and
such public announcement does not arise solely out of the subject com-
pany's disclosure duty, the public announcement will be viewed as being
made on behalf of the bidder.
Id. (quoting Interpretative Release Relating to Tender Offer Rules, Exchange Act
Release No. 34-16,623, 3 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 24,2841 (March 5, 1980)).
44. Id. (citing Interpretative Release Relating to Tender Offer Rules, Ex-
change Act Release No. 34-16,623, 3 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 24,2841 (March 5,
1980)). This affirmation may occur when the bidder may not be able to deny its
intentions. Id. The information in the affirmation relates to the tender offer re-
quirements in Rule 14d-2(c). Id. This affirmation does not occur as a result of a
joint press release, but usually requires a subsequent publication by or on behalf of
the bidder. Id.
45. Field v. Trump, 850 F.2d 938, 942 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S.
1012 (1989). The "Best Price Rule" of the Williams Act states that:
Where any person varies the terms of a tender offer or request or invita-
tion for tenders before the expiration thereof by increasing the consider-
ation offered to holders of such securities, such person shall pay the
increased consideration to each security holder whose securities are
taken up and paid for pursuant to tender offer or request or invitation
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holders of the securities subject to the offer and that such holders must
receive the highest consideration paid during the tender offer period.4 6
The SEC adopted Rule 14d-10 to codify the "Best Price Rule" and the "all
holders" requirement.47 To assert a Rule 14d-10 claim, the plaintiff must
allege and prove that a tender offer commenced under Rule 14d-2 prior
to the occurrence of the complained purchases.4 8 The SEC also promul-
gated Rule lOb-13, which prohibits "side transactions" and purchases dur-
ing the tender offer period, to prevent price discrimination. 49
In Field v. Trump,50 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit discussed the interplay among Rule 14d-2, Rule 14d-7 and Rule
for tenders whether or not such securities have been taken up by such
person before the variation of the tender offer or request or invitation.
Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(7)(1968)).
46. Id. (citing Proposed Amendments to Tender Offer Rules, Exchange Act
Release No. 22,198 [1984-85 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 83,797
(July 1, 1985)). The purpose of the SEC's position is "to prevent a tender offeror
from discriminating in price among tendering shareholders." Id.; see Proposed
Amendments to Tender Offer Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 22,198, [1984-85
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,797 (July 1, 1985) (noting SEC's
position favoring "all holders" requirement and "Best Price Rule").
47. Field, 850 F.2d at 942-43. The "all holders" requirement provides that:
(a) No bidder shall make a tender offer unless:
(1) The tender offer is open to all security holders of the class of securi-
ties subject to the tender offer; and
(2) The consideration paid to any security holder pursuant to the tender
offer is the highest consideration paid to any other security holder during
such tender offer.
Id. at 943 (citing 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-10 (1987)).
48. Kahn v. Virginia Retirement Sys., 783 F. Supp. 266, 269 (E.D. Va. 1992),
aff'd, 13 F.3d 110 (1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1834 (1994). The court also noted
that:
[i]n order to establish a violation of Rule 14d-10, plaintiffs must allege
and prove at a minimum, four elements: (1) that the bidder, (2) during
the pendency of the bidder's tender offer, (3) purchased a security sub-
ject to the tender offer, (4) for more consideration than the bidder paid
to other shareholders pursuant to the tender offer.
Id.
49. Field, 850 F.2d at 943. Rule 10b-13 provides in pertinent part:
(a) No person who makes a cash tender offer or exchange offer for any
equity security shall, directly or indirectly, purchase, or make any arrange-
ment to purchase, any such security (or any other security which is imme-
diately convertible into or exchangeable for such security), otherwise
than pursuant to such tender offer or exchange offer, from the time such
tender offer or exchange offer is publicly announced or otherwise made
known by such person to holders of the security to be acquired until the
expiration of the period, including any extensions thereof, during which
securities tendered pursuant to such tender offer or exchange offer may
by the terms of such offer be accepted or rejected.
Id. (citing 17 C.F.R. § 240.10(b)-13 (1992)). "Side transactions" refer to purchases
of securities subject to a tender offer outside the scope of the tender offer. Id.
50. 850 F.2d 938 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1012 (1989).
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14d-10. 51 In Field, Pay 'N Save, the target corporation, publicized a merger
and tender offer with the Trumps, a group of potential investors, in a Sep-
tember 7, 1984 press release.52 Five days later, the Trumps withdrew their
tender offer with Pay 'N Save and commenced negotiations with the
Stroums, owners of 18% of Pay 'N Save's outstanding common stock.53
The plaintiff shareholders alleged that the Stroums received a premium
from these negotiations, not available to the other shareholders, that vio-
lated the "Best Price Rule".54 The district court dismissed the Rule 14d-7
complaint and concluded that, based on the Trumps' withdrawal, no
tender offers existed on the settlement agreement date.5 5 The Second
Circuit reversed holding that, based on the lower court's reasoning,
tender offerors would circumvent the "Best Price Rule" by periodically
withdrawing their tender offer, during which time they make purchases at
premiums and after which time they announce a new tender offer.56
51. Id. at 943. The district court relied on SEC Rule 14d-2(b), which governs
the commencement of a tender offer. Id. This rule provides that "such tender
offer shall not be deemed to [have commenced under this section] on the date of
such public announcement if within five business days of such public announce-
ment, the bidder... [m]akes a subsequent public announcement stating that the
bidder has determined not to continue with such tender offer .... " Id. (citing 17
C.F.R. § 240.14d-2(b) (1987)). For a detailed discussion of these provisions of the
Williams Act, see supra notes 25-32 and accompanying text.
52. Field, 850 F.2d at 941. The case involves Pay 'N Save Corporation's acquisi-
tion of Schuck's Auto Supply, Inc. in January of 1984. Id. The transaction resulted
in Samuel N. Stroum and Stuart M. Sloan, the defendants (the Stroums), holding
18.4% of Pay 'N Save's outstanding common stock. Id. On August 31, Julius and
Eddie Trump (the Trumps), through corporations they owned and controlled,
proposed a cash tender offer of $22.00 per share for two-thirds of the company's
outstanding common shares. Id. This transaction was to be followed by a cash-out
merger at the same price. Id. One week later, the Trumps raised their offer to
$22.50 per share, but warned that it was a "take it or leave it" offer. Id. The major-
ity of the Pay 'N Save Board of Directors approved the $22.50 offer. Id. However,
Stroum and Sloan dissented. Id. The board publicized the $22.50 offer in a press
release. Id.
53. Id. at 941. At 5:10 p.m. on September 12, after a meeting between the
Trumps and the Stroums, the Trumps told Pay 'N Save's Board of Directors that
they were withdrawing the previously announced tender offer in order to facilitate
the negotiations with the Stroums. Id.
54. Id. at 942. The subsequent negotiations with the Stroums produced a $4.2
million settlement agreement at a price of $25.00 per share. Id. The settlement
agreement included $3.3 million for an option to purchase the Stroum's shares at
$23.50 per share. Id. Additionally, the Trumps paid the Stroums $900,000 for the
Stroums' "fees and expenses." Id. The next day Pay 'N Save issued a press release
announcing that the Trumps would commence a new $23.50 per share tender
offer. Id.
55. Id. at 943. Although the public announcement of the key terms of a
tender offer results in the technical commencement of such offer, the offer will be
deemed to have not commenced if a withdrawal is announced in five business days.
17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-2(b) (1987).
56. Field, 850 F.2d at 944. The Field court explained that the "Best Price Rule"
is unenforceable if offerors may periodically announce withdrawals during which
purchases are made followed by new tender offers. Id. The court stated that
whether the $900,000 of fees and expenses the Trumps paid the Stroums were
11
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C. Materiality Before Basic Inc.
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Basic -Inc., federal circuit
courts that had addressed the materiality of possible takeover discussions
reached different results. 5 7 In Staffin v. Genberg,58 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit found that information regarding
preliminary merger talks remains immaterial as a matter of law until the
parties agree in principle on the price and structure of the transaction.59
The three rationales supporting this "agreement in principle" test include
the bright-line nature of the rule, the need to preserve the confidentiality
of merger discussions and the concern of overwhelming an investor with
trivial information. 60 In another ruling, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Sixth Circuit concluded that preliminary negotiations were
actually incurred remains irrelevant under the "Best Price Rule." Id. The Trumps
expended some or all of those sums to obtain a premium for the Stroums. Id. at
944 n.1. Additionally, the Field court noted the "Best Price Rule" would be unwork-
able if offerors were permitted to discriminate among shareholders according to
expenses that were not uniformly incurred. Id.
57. For a discussion of the varying results of the federal circuit courts before
Basic Inc., see infra notes 58-62 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the
Supreme Court's decision in Basic Inc., see infra notes 63-73 and accompanying
text.
58. 672 F.2d 1196 (3d Cir. 1982).
59. Id. From 1968 to 1979, Herbert Cook and his family controlled between
16% and 20% of the stock of Bluebird Incorporated, one of the nation's largest
producers of ham. Id. at 1198. Joel Greenberg, a Chicago commodities trader,
requested membership on Bluebird's board of directors in 1977. Id. Cook did not
"like or trust" Greenberg, and he rejected each of Greenberg's attempts to join the
board of directors. Id. Ultimately, on March 27, 1979, Greenberg purchased
Cook's shares for $12.50 per share, and Cook left the company. Id. at 1199. Blue-
bird issued a tender offer to its shareholders on June 11, 1979 and extended it to
July 6,1979. Id. On July 12, 1979, Cook met with Northern Inc., a potential "white
knight," to discuss the possibility of Northern acquiring Greenberg's controlling
interest. Id. at 1200. Cook contacted Greenberg about this discussion and sched-
uled a meeting between Northern and Greenberg for mid-August. Id. In the first
week of August, Bluebird's prior stock jumped dramatically. Id. Bluebird issued a
press release on August 7, 1979 disclosing exploratory talks with an unidentified
purchaser. Id. On August 10, 1979, Greenberg brought a suit in the District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania to uncover evidence that defendants had
fraudulently concealed a plan to merge Bluebird and Northern. Id. On August
23, 1979, Northern, Bluebird, Cook, and Greenberg reached an agreement in
principle for Northern to purchase all of Bluebird's stock for $14.875 per share.
Id.
60. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 233-34 (1988). Other circuits
have supported the agreement in principle test. See, e.g., Flamm v. Eberstadt, 814
F.2d 1169, 1176 (7th Cir. 1987) (explaining that disclosure may compromise cor-
porate position and may hurt shareholder more than help); Greenfield v. Heu-
blein, Inc., 742 F.2d 751, 756 (3d Cir. 1984) (stating that agreement as to price
and structure must be reached before finding of materiality is made), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 1215 (1985) Reiss v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 711 F.2d 11, 14 (2d Cir.
1983) (noting that duty to disclose ongoing merger negotiation is triggered when
agreement in principle is released). For support of the Supreme Court's dismissal
of the agreement in principle test in Basic Inc., see infra notes 69-73 and accompa-
nying text.
[Vol. 40: p. 263
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material because a corporation denied their existence. 61 Finally, the
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit determined the materi-
ality of merger negotiations on a case-by-case basis, based on the totality of
circumstances. 62
D. Basic Inc. v. Levinson: The Supreme Court Defines Materiality in the
Corporate Disclosure Context.
The United States Supreme Court sought to resolve the split among
federal circuit courts of appeals regarding the proper standard of material-
ity applicable to preliminary mergers in Basic Inc. v Levinson.6 3 The
Supreme Court also addressed the narrow question "whether information
concerning the existence and status of preliminary merger discussions is
significant to a reasonable investor's trading decision." 64 From September
1976 to December 1978, Basic Inc. and Combustion Engineering dis-
cussed a possible merger.65 During this time, Basic Inc. officials made
three public statements denying merger plans.6 6 As a result, Max Levin-
61. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 786 F.2d 741, 748 (6th Cir. 1986). Subsequently,
the Sixth Circuit denied a petition for rehearing en banc in this case. Basic Inc.,
485 U.S. at 237 n.15. Judge Welford, concurring separately, explained that he did
not read the panel's opinion to create a "conclusive presumption of materiality for
any undisclosed information claimed to render inaccurate statements denying the
existence of alleged preliminary merger discussions." Id. Judge Welford believed
that the decision simply reversed the district court decision, based on an agree-
ment in principle standard. Id.
62. Holmes v. Bateson, 583 F.2d 542, 558 (1st Cir. 1978) (upholding material-
ity finding of lower court regarding omission of information relating to merger
negotiations and corporation's financial condition); see also Huddleston v. Herman
& MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 546 (5th Cir. 1981) (noting that whether actions violate
Rule 10b-5 involves specific factual questions); Mallis v. Bankers Trust Co., 615
F.2d 68, 79-80 (2d Cir. 1980) (limiting scienter requirement for Rule 10b-5 actions
to facts of particular case); Sherman v. Sokoloff, 570 F. Supp. 1266, 1269 & n.8
(S.D.N.Y. 1983) (focusing on financial sophistication of plaintiffs in determining
duty to disclose).
63. Basic Inc., 485 U.S. at 230.
64. Id. at 235.
65. Basic Inc., 786 F.2d at 743-45. In September of 1976, Combustion Engi-
neering, Inc. (Combustion) began discussing a possible merger with Basic Inc. Id.
at 743. In November of 1976, Combustion had its investment bankers prepare
acquisition analyses of Basic Inc. at prices of $18, $20 and $22 per share. Id. at 743-
44. In August of 1977 and on October 18, 1977, Basic Inc., discussed valuation of
the company with its investment bankers for use in merger negotiations. Id. at
744. On repeated occasions through 1977 and 1978, high trading occurred in
Basic Inc. stock. See Callaway, supra note 1, at 152. On October 19 and 20, 1977,
trading was particularly heavy when volume rose to 29,000 shares per day from an
average of 6,000 to 8,000 shares per day. Id. On December 14, 1978, Combustion
approved Basic Inc.'s acquisition offer at $46 per share. Basic Inc., 786 F.2d at 745.
66. Basic Inc., 786 F. 2d at 742. On October 21, 1977, Basic Inc. issued a
public statement that said "the company knew of no reason for the stock's activity
and that no negotiations were underway with any company for a merger." Id. at
745. Negotiations between the two companies continued into 1978. Id. On July
14, 1978, Basic Inc. continued to flatly deny the existence of any undisclosed
merger plans. Id. Basic Inc. again flatly denied any merger negotiations on Sep-
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son and two other shareholders later brought suit alleging that these false
and misleading denials violated SEC Rule 10b-5.6 7 On appeal, the United
States Supreme Court held that materiality hinges on the significance that
a reasonable investor would place on the omitted or misrepresented
information. 68
Basic Inc. thus requires a fact-intensive, case-by-case, analysis when de-
termining the materiality of contingent corporate events. 69 According to
tember 25, 1978 in a "Nine Month" interim report to shareholders on October 12,
1978. Id. The October 12 statement read: "[w]ith regard to the stock market activ-
ity in the Company's shares we remain unaware of any present or pending develop-
ments which would account for the high volume of trading and price fluctuations
in recent months." Id. Basic Inc.'s management also denied any knowledge of a
corporate development the day after the December 14, 1978 acquisition offer. Id.
67. Id. at 742-43. The plaintiffs are a representative class of shareholders who
sold stock between October 21, 1977 and December 15, 1978 at artificially de-
pressed prices. Id. at 743. Because of the misrepresentations, the shareholders
claim that they sold stock at low prices, sustaining considerable loss. Id. The Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of Ohio granted summary judgment to Basic
Inc. based on the finding that the statements were not material and thus neither
false nor misleading. Id. However, the district court applied a presumption of
reliance when it certified the derivative suit thereby supporting a fraud-on-the-mar-
ket theory. Id. at 749-50.
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that
a duty to disclose arose when Basic Inc.'s corporate officials made statements re-
garding the merger rumors. Id. at 746. The Sixth Circuit found that Basic Inc.
misled the public when it issued statements declaring that it did not know why its
stock was trading at a high volume with large fluctuations. Id. at 748. The court
reasoned that information concerning insignificant developments become mate-
rial when corporate executives affirmatively deny the existence of such develop-
ments. Id. The information denied is material whether or not the information
would have been material absent denial. Id.
68. Basic Inc., 485 U.S. at 240. The Supreme Court extended the materiality
test established in TSC Industries to situations involving the determination of mate-
riality in the context of preliminary merger discussions. Id. TSC Industries estab-
lished a standard that "[a]n omitted fact is material if there is a substantial
likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in deciding
how to vote." TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976). The
Supreme Court found no authority in the text of Rule 10b-5, the legislative history
or previous decisions for altering the materiality standard depending on the plain-
tiff's identity or evidence of insider profit. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1986); see, e.g.,
Pavlidis v. New England Patriots Football Club, Inc., 737 F.2d 1227, 1231 (1st Cir.
1984) (noting that "[a] fact does not become more material to the shareholder's
decision because it is withheld by an insider, or because the insider might profit by
withholding it"); cf. Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 691 (1980) (noting that "scienter
is an element of a violation of [section] 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, regardless of the
identity of the plaintiff or the nature of the relief sought"). Insider trading can
alone indicate materiality. See SEC v. Geon Indus., Inc., 531 F.2d 39, 48 (2d Cir.
1976) (noting that "[i]n cases of the disclosure of inside information to a favored
few, determination of materiality has a different aspect than when the issue is, for
example, an inaccuracy in a publicly disseminated press release"); SEC v. Texas
Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 851 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc) (explaining that
insider must either disclose significant information or abstain from trading).
69. Basic Inc., 485 U.S. at 239. The SEC has endorsed the highly fact sensitive
probability/magnitude balancing approach of Texas Gulf SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulfer
Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc). The Texas Gulfcourt explained
276
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the Supreme Court, the proper mode of analysis involves evaluating both
the probability of the event and the transaction's anticipated magnitude in
light of the totality of corporate activity.70 The Supreme Court also
adopted the theory expressed by Justice Friendly, in SEC v. Geon Industries
Inc.,7 1 that information regarding a merger may potentially be the most
important event in a corporation's life. 72 In rejecting the "agreement in
principle" test, the Supreme Court attacked each of the three rationales
supporting that standard. 73
E. The Progeny of Basic Inc.
Certain federal courts have applied the Basic Inc. materiality formula-
tion to corporate disclosure cases.7 4 In Taylor v. First Union of South Caro-
that the possibility of merger, even if no merger takes place, may still have immedi-
ate significance to investors in corporate securities. Id. at 850. The Second Circuit
does not require immediate disclosure of material facts. Id. at 859 n.12. The tim-
ing of disclosure is based on the corporate officers' judgment coupled with the
requirements of the exchanges and the SEC. Id. In some instances, a valid corpo-
rate purpose is served by delaying publication of corporate information. Id.
70. Basic Inc., 485 U.S. at 238-39 (citing Texas Guf, 401 F.2d at 849). The
corporation must examine internal functions, actions and interests of the corpo-
rate officials charged with making the alleged merger decision. Id. at 239. Then,
the corporation must consider the relative sizes of the two corporations and possi-
ble market impact of their merger. Id. The Court noted that "board resolutions,
instructions to investment bankers, and actual negotiations between principals or
their intermediaries may serve as indicia of [the corporation's] interest." Id. To
assess the magnitude of the transaction, the factfinder should consider the size of
the entities and the possible premiums over market prices. Id.
71. 531 F.2d 39, 47-48 (2d Cir. 1976).
72. Basic Inc., 485 U.S. at 238 (citing Geon, 531 F.2d at 47-48). This informa-
tion can become material at an earlier stage than would be the case with lesser
transactions, even though the possibility that the merger might never be com-
pleted may be high. See Geon, 531 F.2d at 48.
73. See Basic Inc., 485 U.S. at 233. The first justification focuses on the tenta-
tive nature of preliminary merger negotiations and the desire to protect the inves-
tor from needless and trivial information. Id. at 234. The Supreme Court adopted
the position that most investors are relatively sophisticated not warranting such
paternalistic protections. Id. (citing Flamm v. Eberstadt, 814 F.2d 1169, 1175 (7th
Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 853 (1987)). The second rationale involved the
importance of secrecy at early stages of merger negotiations. Id. at 234-35. The
Court emphasized the distinction between legitimate secrecy and blatant inaccu-
racy. Id. at 239 n.17. One may be silent and not mislead under Rule 10b-5. Id.
The Supreme Court reasoned that the secrecy rationale was inapposite to the ma-
teriality question. Id. The Court did concede that a bright-line rule might be ad-
ministratively convenient. Id. at 236. Nevertheless, ease of application alone is not
an excuse to ignore the purposes of the Securities Act. Id. The Court cautioned
and garnished support from the Advisory Committee on Corporate Disclosure,
against confining materiality to a rigid formula. Id. The Supreme Court also re-
jected the Sixth Circuit rationale that the denial of a statement rendered it mate-
rial. Basic Inc., 786 F.2d at 749. The Court concluded that this approach failed to
demonstrate adequately that statements were misleading as to a material fact. Ba-
sic Inc., 485 U.S. at 238.
74. For a discussion of these federal cases, see infra notes 75-94 and accompa-
nying text.
1995] NOTE
15
Nearing: Kahn v. Virginia Retirement System: The Impact of Rule 10b-5's Co
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1995
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
lina,75 the Fourth Circuit held that speculative merger discussions were
not material under Basic Inc.76 The court noted that the plaintiffs lacked
evidence of an agreement in principle, board resolutions, actual negotia-
tions or instructions to investment bankers to facilitate the merger. 77 Ad-
ditionally, the merger between the parties hinged on a change in the
interstate banking laws.78 The court concluded that these discussions only
reflected a vague promise to establish a future relationship and did not
warrant disclosure under Rule 10b-5.
79
75. 857 F.2d 240 (4th Cir. 1988).
76. Id. at 242. In February 1984, after a bitter dispute, Southern forced Ben-
nie Taylor to resign his position as a director and agreed to repurchase Taylor's
Southern stock. Id. After Southern refused to repurchase Bennie Taylor's shares
above the market price, Bennie and Patricia Taylor (the Taylors) initiated negotia-
tions with First Union, and agreed to sell their Southern stock to First Union for
$18 per share. Id. First Union did not inform the Taylors that'it had previously
approached Southern to discuss a merger between the two banks if interstate bank-
ing became legal in South Carolina. Id. Sixteen months later, after the Supreme
Court declared interstate banking constitutional, First Union and Southern met
several times to solidify the merger proposal. Id. at 243. First Union purchased all
of Southern's outstanding stock for $33 per share. Id. The Taylors sued both
Southern and First Union claiming that the banks conspired to withhold informa-
tion from them to facilitate the acquisition of their shares at artificially low prices.
Id.
77. Id. at 243. First Union and Southern had established a business relation-
ship at the time First Union and Bennie Taylor negotiated the sale of the Taylors'
stock. Id. This business relationship remained changeable. See id. Business peo-
ple routinely discuss and exchange information on matters that may or may not
result in some future agreement. Id. at 244. The court determined that First
Union had no general duty to disclose material facts prior to purchasing stock of
Southern from a Southern shareholder. Id.; see also Holstein v. Armstrong, 751 F.
Supp. 746, 747 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (holding that directors of UAL did not violate Rule
10b-5 by failing to publicly disclose takeover proposal). The defendants in Holstein
had not traded UAL stock and had not made misleading statements regarding the
takeover proposal. Id.
78. Taylor, 857 F.2d at 243. The United States Supreme Court had yet to rule
on the constitutionality of interstate banking. Id. Thus, the merger was contin-
gent upon a change in the banking laws beyond the control of the parties. Id.
79. Id. at 244. Evidence indicated that Taylor attended the Southern Board
of Directors' meeting, approving First Union's investment in Southern. Id. Taylor
knew that Southern presented an attractive acquisition target should interstate
banking become legal. Id. Taylor had also been warned by his attorney of a possi-
ble Southern-First Union merger. Id. The court might have been influenced by
the plaintiff's position as a savvy business man who should have anticipated the
possibility of a merger. See id. at 242-44. Therefore, the incremental information
that certain meetings had occurred and understandings reached between the two
institutions would not materially add to the mix of information available to a rea-
sonable investor. Id. at 244.
Had Bennie and Patricia Taylor sold their stock to Southern, as initially in-
tended, Southern may have had a duty to disclose material information because it
would have been trading in its own stock. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401
F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc) (stating- that insiders must disclose material
information or abstain from trading and recommending securities). The Fourth
Circuit's materiality analysis would then have been more critical to the outcome of
this decision. See id. (noting mandatory disclosure of inside trading information).
[Vol. 40: p. 263
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In Jackvony v. Rhode Island Hospital Trust Financial Corp.,80 the First Cir-
cuit affirmed a directed verdict for Hospital Trust, ruling that a company's
"general interest" in a merger was not material absent specific pre-merger
events. 8 ' The court found that Hospital Trust considered itself a potential
takeover target and that the officers and directors discussed the possibility
of seeking a merger with another bank.8 2 However, unlike the issuer in
Basic Inc., Hospital Trust had not received any concrete offers and had not
engaged in any specific discussions with a potential merger partner.8 3 Be-
cause the public was aware of the deregulation and takeover environment,
the undisclosed information would not alter the total mix of information
available to investors. 84
In Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. Federated Department Stores, Inc.,8 5 the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York held
that merger prospects are not necessarily material for Rule 1Ob-5 pur-
poses. 86 In determining the probability of a takeover, the Hartford court
focused on the level of interest demonstrated at the highest corporate
80. 873 F.2d 411 (1st Cir. 1989).
81. Id. at 414. This case arose from a stock purchase, resulting in a merger
between Columbus National Bank and Hospital Trust. Id. Mr. Jackvony, a share-
holder of Columbus, claimed that Hospital Trust should have disclosed its "general
interest" in facilitating a merger with a larger bank prior to closing the merger with
Columbus. Id. He alleged that had he known Hospital Trust considered itself a
potential takeover target at the time of the merger, he would have elected to take
more Hospital Trust shares instead of cash for his Columbus stock. Id. Hospital
Trust was acquired at a premium by another bank. Id.
82. Id. Hospital Trust directors and officers had expressed concern internally
about being acquired merely in the broader context of considering various options
for the future. Id.
83. Id. at 415. Any reasonably sophisticated investor buying securities in a
large corporation would expect other corporations to express occasional interest
in buying such shares. Id. A reasonable investor would also expect a large corpo-
ration's directors to discuss a plan of action in the event of such an offer. Id. The
court stated that announcements made by large corporations every time directors
discuss matters in vague terms such as those presented in this case or receive "ten-
tative feelers" of the general kind here, would more likely confuse, rather than
inform, the marketplace. Id.
84. Id. Additionally, in 1982, the banking community believed that banking
laws would soon change, and that previously forbidden interstate bank expansion
would soon become permissible. Id. The community was also aware that many
regional banks were considering expansion and that some New England banks
might acquire others. Id. Given this general knowledge, the information Jackvony
cites would not alter the mix of information available to a reasonable investor. Id.
85. 723 F. Supp. 976 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
86. Id. at 976-80. In Hartford, bondholders of Federated Department Stores
sued, claiming that Federated had failed to disclose in the bond offering the possi-
bility of Federated's acquisition in a highly leveraged takeover. Id. Such an acqui-
sition would increase the risk of the bonds. Id. For some time, Federated had
considered itself a prime takeover candidate prior to the issuance of the bonds. Id.
Federated was eventually acquired by Campeau U.S. in a highly leveraged hostile
transaction. Id. Shortly thereafter, the investment grade of the bonds plummeted
from low-risk ratings to 'Junk" status. Id.
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levels.8 7 The district court found that the possibility of a takeover was un-
likely because Federated showed no acquisition interest and lacked con-
trol over the timing of a hostile takeover.8 8 Federated could not gauge the
magnitude of the event because it could not anticipate the takeover's
structure, the debt to be incurred, or the size of the entities involved.8 9
Finally, non-disclosure would not alter the overall mix of available infor-
mation because Federated was considered an attractive candidate in a
takeover environment. 90 Like the First Circuit's decision in Jacknovy, Hart-
ford involved general concerns regarding possible acquisition, but no spe-
cific pre-merger events occurred. 91 The investing public likewise
remained aware of the general takeover environment. 92
The post-Basic Inc. cases demonstrate the Supreme Court's flexible
and fact-specific approach to materiality has not altered traditional disclo-
87. In re Columbia Sec. Litig., 747 F. Supp. 237 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). Allegations
of meetings with top executives of a merger candidate and movements at executive
levels to pursue and finalize a merger with such a candidate, indicate an interest at
the highest corporate level. Id. at 243. This higher level interest precludes a mo-
tion to dismiss for failure to plead adequately that press releases denying merger
negotiations were materially misleading. Id.
88. Hartford, 723 F. Supp. at 987. Federated was widely rumored as a possible
takeover candidate, but the company had not identified a potential acquiror, nor
had a suitor contacted Federated or made an offer to purchase the company. Id.
In addition, Federated had not indicated any interest in being acquired. Id. No
board resolutions, instructions to investment bankers, contacts with lawyers, or ne-
gotiations with another company existed. Id. On the contrary, Federated demon-
strated their opposition to a takeover by instituting a shareholder rights plan and
repurchasing large blocks of its stock. Id.
89. Id. When the plaintiffs purchased the notes, the magnitude of the trans-
action could not be determined with exactitude. Id. Absent an indication of inter-
est, a formal offer, or some progress toward the price and structure of the
transaction, Federated had no means of appraising the size of the two corporate
entities or the potential premiums above market price. Id,
90. Id. at 987-88. Disclosure that Federated was an attractive "takeover" candi-
date, that management might receive offers, or that a highly leveraged acquisition
could transform the company's structure and long term forecast would not have
altered the "total mix" of information available to investors. Id. Indeed, years
before Federated issued the notes, press reports in the business community identi-
fied Federated as an attractive takeover possibility and a frequently discussed acqui-
sition target. Id. at 988. Articles also appeared detailing the risks that takeovers
posed for those holding investment grade securities like bonds and notes. Id.
91. Id. at 988. For a discussion of Jackvony, see supra notes 80-84 and accom-
panying text.
92. Id. at 988-89. Despite the fact-intensive nature of the Basic Inc. inquiry,
summary judgment is appropriate where the prospective merger is too inchoate to
be material. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 241 (1988); see also Savage v.
Federated Dep't Stores Inc., Retirement Income & Thrift Incentive, No. 89-5425
(D.N.J.), aff'd, 893 F.2d 1331 (3d Cir. 1989) (stating that omitted information can-
not be considered misleading, and thus give rise to duty to disclose, if that informa-
tion is already available in marketplace). For a detailed analysis of this
proposition, see In reApple Sec. Lifig., 886 F.2d 1109, 1113 (9th Cir. 1989) (noting
summary judgment may be granted in appropriate securities fraud cases despite
fact-specific nature of materiality), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 3229 (1990).
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sure obligations under federal securities laws. 93 The plaintiffs must first
prove that the issuer had a duty to disclose, and second show that the
omitted information was material. 94 Against this backdrop, the Kahn
court considered the June 18, 1991 press release disclosing the proposed
terms of Richmond Fredricksburg and Potomac Corporation's ("RF&P")
restructuring.9 5
III. KAHN V. VIRCIMA RETEMEVT SYS7FM
A. Facts
Beginning in 1983, CSX Corporation ("CSX") wanted to obtain con-
trol over RF&P's 113-mile rail line, strategically located in the middle of
CSX's rail network.96 In 1985, RF&P formed a Special Committee of in-
dependent members of RF&P's Board of Directors to consider various
transactions with CSX.97Between 1986 and early 1991, the Special Com-
93. See, e.g., Bolton v. Tesoro Petroleum Corp., 871 F.2d 1266 (5th Cir. 1989)
(applying fact-intensive analysis to corporate restructuring), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct.
83 (1989); Seagoing Uniform Corp. v. Texaco, Inc., 705 F. Supp. 918 (S.D.N.Y.
1989) (applying fact-intensive analysis to greenmail); SEC v. Clark, 699 F. Supp.
839, 846 (W.D. Wash. 1988) (emphasizing that materiality is fact-intensive question
for enforcing actions against persons trading on non-public information); In re
General Motors Class E Stock Buyout Sec. Litig., 694 F. Supp. 1119 (D. Del. 1988)
(applying fact-specific analysis to negotiations regarding sale of subsidiary, and em-
ployee stock purchase options). For a critical analysis of how these disclosure obli-
gations apply to the Kahn case, see infra notes 166-73 and accompanying text. For
commentary supporting this analysis, see supra note 92. See alsoJackvony v. Rhode
Island Hosp. Trust Fin. Corp., 873 F.2d 411 (1st Cir. 1989) (noting, after fact-
intensive analysis, agreement was too speculative to require disclosure); In re Co-
lumbia Sec. Litig., 747 F. Supp. 237, 237 (noting that meetings of top shareholders
resulting in merger possibility is beyond speculative); Hartford, 723 F. Supp. at 976
(noting, based on specific factual context, potential sale or leveraged buyout were
not material).
94. Basic Inc., 485 U.S. at 239 n.17. The disclosure duty arises when a corpora-
tion trades in its own securities, makes prior inaccurate disclosures, or when a
statute mandates disclosure. Roeder v. Alpha Indus., Inc., 814 F.2d 22 (1st Cir.
1987). For the text of Rule 10b-5(b) regarding the duty of disclosure and material-
ity, see supra note 4.
95. Kahn v. Virginia Retirement Sys., 13 F.3d 110, 111 (4th Cir. 1993), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 1834 (1994). Specifically, the plaintiff shareholders claim this
press release constitutes a "tender offer" pursuant to Rule 14d-2 of the Williams
Act. Id. at 112. For a discussion of this portion of the Williams Act, see supra note
48 and accompanying text.
96. Kahn 13 F.3d at 112. Without access to the RF&P rail lines, CSX would be
forced to seek costly and inefficient methods of connecting its rail traffic. Kahn v.
Virginia Retirement Sys., 783 F. Supp. 266, 267 (E.D. Va. 1992), aff'd, 13 F.3d 110
(1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1834 (1994). This access would conveniently link its
northern rail lines (the old Chessie system) and its southern rail lines (the former
Seaboard system). Kahn, 13 F.3d at 112.
97. Kahn, 783 F. Supp. at 267.
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mittee considered and proposed a variety of transactions that RF&P's
Board of Directors rejected.98
In February 1991, the Virginia General Assembly included a budget
directive that the Virginia Retirement System ("VRS") purchase the Com-
monwealth's appreciation rights on 3.5 million restricted RF&P shares
owned by VRS.99 These appreciation rights allowed the Common-
wealth to purchase the shares from VRS at VRS's determined book
value, and subsequently resell the shares to VRS at market price.100 In
May, 1991, the Governor signed this budget directive into law.10 1 VRS
transferred $71 million to the Commonwealth to obtain clear title to
3.5 million shares of non-voting stock. 10 2 Previously, the Special Com-
mittee issued a press release, recommending a revised joint transaction
among RF&P, CSX and VRS.103 The RF&P Board of Directors later is-
98. Kahn, 13 F.3d at 112. These transactions included a sale of RF&P's rail-
road assets, an asset stock exchange, a cash-out merger and a tender offer. Kahn,
783 F. Supp. at 267.
99. Kahn, 13 F.3d at 112. The Commonwealth sold these shares for approxi-
mately $71 million. Id.
100. Id. at 112. The net effect of the transaction was that the Commonwealth
received $48.21 per share. Id. at 112-13 n.3. At the time of the transaction, the
Commonwealth had the right to purchase the shares from VRS at the VRS deter-
mined book value of $28.00, and subsequently resell to VRS at market price. Id.
In this case, the Commonwealth sold its right in the shares to VRS for the net
amount of $20.21 per share in lieu of purchasing and reselling the shares. Id. This
amount was the equivalent of the Commonwealth buying the shares from VRS at
$28.00 per share and reselling them to VRS at $48.21 per share. Id.
101. Id. at 112. Prior to the transaction the Commonwealth had the right to
purchase the RF&P stock from VRS. Kahn, 783 F. Supp. at 268. The Common-
wealth could not sell this right to anyone at the original market price, but could
resell it to VRS and realize the appreciation on the stock. Id. For a discussion of
the mechanics of the appreciation recognition, see supra note 100 and accompany-
ing text.
102. Kahn, 783 F. Supp. at 268. This transfer occurred on June 28, 1991, 10
days after the RF&P Special Committee issued a public announcement recom-
mending a revised three-way transaction between RF&P, CSX and VRS to the
RF&P Board of Directors. Id. For the text of the RF&P press release, see infra note
103. For a discussion of the three-way transaction, see supra notes 100-01 & infra
notes 103-04 and accompanying text.
103. Kahn, 13 F.3d at 112. RF&P issued this press release onJune 18, 1991,
using RF&P stationary, stated in full:
A Special Committee of RF&P Corporation's Board of Directors an-
nounced today that it was prepared to recommend to RF&P's Board of
Directors a revised transaction among RF&P, CSX Corporation and the
Virginia Retirement System in which RF&P's public shareholders would
have the opportunity to receive $39 per share in cash for any and all of
their shares. In the proposed transaction, CSX Corporation effectively
will transfer to RF&P and VRS the approximately 6.8 million shares of
RF&P it owns or controls for $35 a share and acquire the RF&P railroad
and receive certain other assets and benefits for $135 million, retaining
the balance of $104 million in cash.
Speaking through its chairman, C. Coleman McGehee, the Special
Committee announced that the proposed transaction still is subject to a
number of conditions including negotiation of definitive agreements and
20
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sued another press release agreeing in principle to the three-way
transaction.10
4
These press releases highlighted the three important transactions
constituting the corporate restructuring. 10 5 First, on August 28, 1991,
CSX and RF&P executed an Asset Purchase Agreement whereby RF&P ob-
tained 3.9 million shares of RF&P non-voting stock held by CSX in ex-
change for RF&P's railroad assets. 106 Second, also on August 28, CSX and
VRS entered a Stock Purchase Agreement where CSX would transfer ap-
proximately 2.97 million shares of RF&P voting and non-voting stock to
VRS for $105.8 million in cash. 107 Finally, on August 30, 1991, Systems
Holding Inc. ("SHI") commenced a public tender offer for all outstanding
shares of RF&P stock at $39.00 per share. 10 8
approval by the RF&P Board. As a part of the proposed offer, the Special
Committee will recommend that the RF&P Board not declare the regular
second quarter dividend, retaining the right to declare the dividend at a
later date if the transaction does not proceed.
Mr. McGehee noted that the revised transaction is a significant im-
provement for the public shareholders. As originally proposed in August,
1990, the public shareholders would have been able to exchange only
about one-sixth of their shares at $35 a share.
Jacqueline G. Epps, Chair of the Virginia Retirement System's Board
of Trustees, stated that "while the negotiations have been long and com-
plicated, it appears that everybody stands to gain from the proposed
transaction."
John W. Snow, chairman and chief executive officer of CSX, said,
"We are pleased with the agreement and look forward to continuing to
operate the RF&P railroad as a key part of the CSX rail system."
Id. at 112 n.2.
104. Id. at 112. RF&P issued this release on June 21, 1991, three days after it
released the press release publicizing the proposed transaction. Id.
105. Id. The overall impact of this transaction is best described as follows:
In short, RF&P is now a real estate company with no railroad operations;
VRS beneficially owns substantially all of the outstanding RF&P stock;
CSX owns and operates the railroad assets; and almost all of RF&P's pub-
lic shareholders have received $39.00 per share in cash for their stock and
are no longer shareholders of RF&P.
Kahn, 783 F. Supp. at 268.
106. Kahn, 13 F.3d at 112. On October 10, 1991, pursuant to a 1991 Asset
Purchase Agreement, executed on August 28, 1991, CSX acquired RF&P's railroad
assets in consideration for the transfer by CSX to RF&P of approximately 3.9 mil-
lion shares of the non-voting RF&P stock. Kahn, 783 F. Supp. at 268. As a result of
this transaction, CSX exchanged the majority of its non-voting stock in RF&P and
now controlled and operated the railroad assets either as the owner or as the bene-
ficiary of permanent easements. Id.
107. Kahn, 13 F.3d at 113. This figure represents a consideration of $35.58
per share. Kahn, 783 F. Supp. at 268. The net result of the stock sale eliminated
CSX as the beneficial owner of 62.7% of the RF&P voting stock and vested in VRS
ownership of substantially all of the RF&P voting stock. Id.
108. Kahn, 13 F.3d at 112. Systems Holdings, Inc., ("SHI") was a wholly-
owned subsidiary of RF&P created to effect the tender offer and to hold RF&P
shares. Id. On October 9, 1991, SHI accepted for payment substantially all the
RF&P shares held by the public shareholders. Kahn, 783 F. Supp. at 268. The
21
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On September 24, 1991, two RF&P shareholders instituted a deriva-
tive suit against VRS, CSX and RF&P alleging violations of section 14d-7 of
the Williams Act and SEC Rule 14d-10. In addition, the shareholders al-
leged the companies violated SEC Rule 10b-13, as well as breaching the
fiduciary duties imposed upon them.10 9
The plaintiffs claimed that the tender offer began on June 18, 1991,
when RF&P's Special Committee issued its press release.11 0 Based on this
alleged tender offer, the plaintiffs asserted that the defendants violated
the "Best Price Rule." 1 According to the complaint, the violations oc-
curred when the Commonwealth transferred 3.5 million shares to VRS on
June 28, 1991 and when CSX received stock in conjunction with the Au-
gust 28, 1991 railroad and stock sales.' 1 2
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia
granted the defendant's Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to
state a cause of action.' 1 3 The district court held that the Special Commit-
tee's June 18, 1991 press release did not commence a tender offer and
that no violation of Rule 14d-7, Rule 14d-10, or Rule 10b-13 occurred.1 14
The district court ruled that the tender offer did not begin until SHI's
RF&P Schedule 14D-9 defines public shareholders as those who own RF&P stock
other than VRS, CSX or their corporate affiliates. Id.
109. Id. at 269. The court dismissed the Williams Act and the 10b-13 claims
and refused to exercise jurisdiction over the state breach of fiduciary duty claim.
Id. The parties stipulated to these terms. Id. For a discussion of Rule 10b-13, see
supra note 49 and accompanying text.
The shareholders filing this lawsuit were Alan R. Kahn and Hunter A. Hogan,
Jr. Kahn, 13 F.3d at 110. These shareholders brought the action in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. Id. Because Kahn sought
damages instead of injunctive relief, the three-way transaction continued until its
completion on October 10, 1991. Id. at 113.
The plaintiffs alleged that VRS and SHI violated the Williams Act. Kahn, 783
F. Supp. at 268. The plaintiffs also claimed that CSX and RF&P aided and abetted
these violations. Id.
110. Id. For a discussion of this press release, see supra note 103 and accom-
panying text.
111. Kahn, 13 F.3d at 113. Rule 14d-10 codifies the "Best Price Rule," requir-
ing that a tender offeror pay every tendering shareholder the highest considera-
tion paid any other shareholder during the term of the tender offer. Kahn, 783 F.
Supp. at 269. For a detailed discussion of the "Best Price Rule," see supra note 45
and accompanying text.
112. Kahn, 783 F. Supp. at 268. The Commonwealth received $48.21 per
share, which exceeded the $39.00 per share in the alleged June 18, 1991 tender
offer. Id. These transactions were also in excess of the $39.00 per share paid to
the shareholders on June 18, 1991. Id. at 269.
113. Kahn, 783 F. Supp. at 267. The court, however, denied the defendant's
claim of immunity under the Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution. Id. at 272-
74. In addition, the district court, after dismissing the federal securities claims, did
not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law breach of fiduciary duty
claim. Kahn, 13 F.3d at 113.
114. Kahn, 783 F. Supp. at 272. Also, the district court asserted that the June
18, 1991 press release did not comply with the requirements for a tender offer
because the release did not identify the bidder. Id.
284
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formal announcement on August 30, 1991.115 The plaintiff shareholders
appealed the district court's decision to grant the defendant's motion to
dismiss. 116
B. Judge Widener's Opinion
1. Tender Offer Analysis
Writing the opinion for the Fourth Circuit, Judge Widener began his
determination of whether the district court properly granted the defend-
ant's Rule 12(b) (6) motion by examining the purpose of the Williams Act
and the impact of classifying a public announcement as a tender offer.' 1 7
He noted that although Congress designed the Act to protect investors,
neither Congress nor the SEC expressly defined what constitutes a tender
offer. 118 The court further stated that as a result of this ambiguity, many
pre-tender offer announcements could trigger market activity normally
linked to valid tender offers and cause investors to make hasty decisions
based on incomplete information." 9 Moreover, the court reasoned that
the SEC promulgated Rule 14d-2 to prevent unintentional tender offers,
by requiring tender offerors to specify the identity of the bidder and the
subject company's identity as well as the amount, class and prices of the
securities offered.' 20 Once a tender offer commences, the court noted
that the bidder has five days either to discontinue the offer or to comply
115. Kahn, 13 F.3d at 113. This tender offer did not commence until SHI's
formal announcement on August 30, 1991. Id.
116. Id. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia
granted the defendant's 12(b) (6) motion to dismiss, but denied the defendant's
sovereign immunity motion. Kahn, 783 F. Supp. at 274.
117. Kahn, 13 F.3d at 113-14. Congress passed the Williams Act in 1968 in
response to the proliferation of cash tender offers for corporate takeovers. Id.
Through the Williams Act, Congress sought to protect investors by requiring
tender offerors to make full and adequate disclosure, and by imposing certain obli-
gations on tender offerors during the tender offer period. Id. For a detailed dis-
cussion of the Williams Act and its purpose, see supra notes 25-32 and
accompanying text.
118. Kahn, 13 F.3d at 114. While this ambiguity gave courts flexibility in de-
termining which actions were subject to the Williams Act, the vagueness also has
allowed certain abuses that the Williams Act originally sought to remedy. See Re-
lease 16,384, supra note 11, at 82,582-83 (noting problems such as arbitrage which
may occur with pre-tender offer public announcements).
119. Kahn, 13 F.3d at 114 (noting that pre-tender offer announcements may
result in uninformed decisions). If tender offer activity begins as a result of a pub-
lic announcement concerning material terms, the contest for control of the sub-
ject company will occur prior to the application of the Williams Act requirements,
thereby denying the shareholders the protection Congress intended to provide.
Kahn, 783 F. Supp. at 271.
120. Kahn, 13 F.3d at 114. These specific requirements allow courts and in-
vestors to distinguish easily between public announcements that start tender offers
and those that do not. Id. This result prevents the abuse linked to the uncertainty
of public announcements, leading to an inadvertent commencement of a tender
offer. Id. For a detailed discussion of Rule 14d-2 of the Williams Act, see supra
notes 11, 31-32 and accompanying text.
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with the filing and disclosure requirements mandated by the Williams
Act.12 1
The Fourth Circuit next examined the RF&P press release in light of
Rule 14d-2's purpose. 122 The court pointed to SEC Regulation 34-16623
which states that Rule 14-d requires a public announcement be made by
or on behalf of the bidder to trigger a tender offer.' 2 3 The shareholders
alleged that the press release satisfied Rule 14d-2(c) because the release
was either made on behalf of VRS, was joint, or was affirmed as a tender
offer.124 The Fourth Circuit rejected the shareholders' argument which
contended that the Special Committee made a joint release, because this
121. Kahn, 13 F.3d at 114. "As a result, it is not anticipated that a bidder
making such a public announcement will select the 'do nothing' alternative." Id.
Usually, if a bidder does nothing, interested investors will try to make the public
announcement of a tender offer, and force bidder compliance with the Williams
Act disclosure requirements. Id. (citing Weeden v. Continental Health Affiliates
Inc., 713 F. Supp. 396, 397 (N.D. Ga. 1989) (seeking to force defendant to comply
with "Five Day Rule" of Rule 14d-2(b) (2))); see also American Carriers Inc. v. Bay-
tree Investors Inc., 685 F. Supp. 800, 801 (D. Kan. 1988) (seeking to enjoin defend-
ants from making or announcing tender offer unless defendants comply with
disclosure requirements of Securities Exchange Act 1934).
122. Id. No basis warrants the conclusion that VRS, or a party on behalf of
VRS, made the June 18, 1991 announcement. Kahn, 783 F. Supp. at 271. The
press release was clearly issued by RF&P, and not the bidder, VRS or SHI. Id.
RF&P issued the press release on their personalized stationary. Id. The release
also outlined the proposed transaction and included several statements by C. Cole-
man McGehee, Chairman of the Special Committee at RF&P. Id. McGehee ex-
plained that the proposed transaction remained subject to a number of
conditions, including approval by the RF&P Board of Directors. Id.
123. Kahn, 13 F. 3d at 115. The SEC interpreted the rules in a question and
answer format, and a question directly on point states:
Question: Will a public announcement by the subject company or by an-
other person having no relationship with a bidder of a bidder's intention
to make a cash tender offer together with the information referred to in
Rule 14d-2(c) commence the five business day period in Rule 14d-2(b)?
Response: No. Only a public announcement by the bidder or on the bid-
der's behalf will commence a tender offer pursuant to any of the provisions
of Rule 14d-2. As a practical matter, however, if a bidder's intention be-
comes generally known, the bidder may be unable to deny its intentions,
and any affirmation of the information referred to in Rule 14d-2(c) by or
on behalf of the bidder would cause the tender offer to start under Rule
14d-2(b).
In certain situations where the bidder and the subject company
agree or arrange that the subject company will make the public an-
nouncement and such public announcement does not arise solely out of
the subject company's disclosure duty, the public announcement will be
viewed as being made on behalf of the bidder.
Id. (quoting Interpretive Release Relating to Tender Offer Rules, Exchange Act
Release No. 34-16,623, 3 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 24,4841 (March 5, 1980) (em-
phasis added)).
124. Kahn, 13 F.3d at 115. Kahn alleged that the release was either joint, or
was affirmed as a VRS tender offer. Id. In support of the assertion that a valid
tender offer existed, Kahn relied on Field v. Trump, 850 F.2d 938 (2d Cir. 1988),
cert. denied 489 U.S. 1012 (1989), in which the Second Circuit concluded that a
press release by a target corporation constituted tender offer. Kahn, 13 F.3d at
[Vol. 40: p. 263
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announcement did not use the specific term "tender offer," failed to iden-
tify the bidder and did not specify a time limit.
12 5
The Fourth Circuit also considered shareholder Kahn's claim that
Field supported the proposition that RF&P'sJune 18, 1991 announcement
constituted a tender offer.126 The court concluded that Field supported a
contrary position because the Field press release positively identified the
bidders. 127 The court further stated that the Trumps' attempt to withdraw
the Field tender offer,' 2 8 as contrasted with VRS' and SHI's inaction in
response to the June 18, 1991 announcement, supported the district
court's holding of "no tender offer."' 2 9 Finally, the absence of any share-
holder reliance on the June 18, 1991 announcement weakened Kahn's
contention that the press release constituted a valid tender offer.'
3 0
The Fourth Circuit revisited the purpose of SEC Rule 14d-2 when ex-
amining Kahn's argument that the June 18, 1991 press release described
the bidder with enough detail for investors to discern the bidder's iden-
tity.131 The court noted that Kahn's assertion would allow vague infer-
115. For a detailed discussion of Field, see supra notes 50-56 and accompanying
text.
125. Kahn, 13 F.3d at 115. The press release did not specify the term "tender
offer," did not announce any fixed time limits, and did not mention the identity of
the bidder. Kahn, 783 F. Supp. at 271. The press release identified and quoted
Jacqueline Epps, the chair of VRS's Board of Directors, but nothing in her state-
ment could be reasonably inferred to mean that VRS was the bidder. Id. Given
the preliminary nature of the negotiations at the time, the proposed transaction,
which was consistent with the RF&P press release, could take one of many forms
including a merger, an exchange offer, or a self-tender offer by RF&P. Id. at 271-
72.
126. Kahn, 13 F.3d at 115. In Field, Pay 'N Save, the target corporation, issued
a press release stating that a merger agreement had been reached with the
Trumps, at the proposed tender offer price of $22.50 per share. Field, 850 F.2d at
941. The Field court found that this press release constituted the commencement
of a tender offer made on behalf of the bidder. Id. at 943. For a detailed discus-
sion of Field, see supra notes 50-56 and accompanying text.
127. Kahn, 13 F.3d at 115. RF&P's announcement did not specify the bidders.
Id. at 112 n.2. Field stated that the announcement constituted a tender offer,
where RF&P's publication did not use the word "tender offer." See id. at 115 (cit-
ing Field, 850 F.2d at 941).
128. Id. On September 12, after a meeting between the Trumps, the Stroums,
and Sloan, the Trumps told the Pay 'N Save Board of Directors that they were
withdrawing their previously announced tender offer. Fied, 850 F.2d at 941. The
Trumps also issued a press release announcing both the withdrawal of their tender
offer and cessation of further negotiations with the Stroums. Id.
129. Kahn, 13 F.3d at 115. In addition to the inactivity after theJune 18, 1991
press release, SHI expressly made a tender offer on August 30, 1991. Id.
130. Id. at 115-16. Finally, the court noted that no shareholder sought to de-
clare a tender offer, enjoin a tender offer, or force VRS/SHI to comply with the
Williams Act. Id. One of these activities typically occurs when a formal tender
offer is declared. Id.
131. Id. at 116. Kahn also asserted that although the June 18, 1991 press re-
lease did not specifically identify the bidder or proposed transaction, RF&P de-
scribed them with sufficient accuracy to allow investors to determine the bidder's
identity. Id. Kahn argued that including the word exchange in the press release
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ences to trigger a tender offer.132 The Fourth Circuit concluded that such
activity defeats the purpose of Rule 14d-2(c) by detracting from the cer-
tainty provided to bidders. 13 3 The court further stated, however, that a
tender offer may begin if a bidder affirms generally known intentions.
134
The court concluded that although the June 18, 1991 press release was
joint, because the bidder did not subsequently affirm the release's infor-
mation, the press release did not constitute a valid tender offer.
135
2. Materiality Analysis
Continuing its analysis, the Fourth Circuit next determined that the
June 18, 1991 public announcement was mandatory under Rule lOb-5 of
the 1934 Securities and Exchange Act.1 36 The court further noted that
the June 18, 1991 announcement was not an agreement in principle that
would fall under the purview of Staffin.137 Nevertheless, the court consid-
ered the Supreme Court's test in Basic Inc. that required preliminary nego-
tiations to be disclosed when their existence and status becomes
allowed investors to identify VRS as the bidder. Id. Kahn also quoted a June 21,
1991 newspaper article explaining the RF&P transaction. Id. The Fourth Circuit
noted that although these inferences may meet the requirements of 14d-2(c),
Kahn's argument failed when considering the purpose of Rule 14d-2. Id.
132. Id. In this case, knowledgeable investors like Kahn, presidents of invest-
ment management firms and reporters would control the commencement of
tender offers. Id. This control would thwart the purpose of the Williams Act. Id.
For a further discussion of the purpose of the Williams Act, see supra notes 10-12,
25-32 and accompanying text.
133. Kahn, F.3d at 116. A press prediction alone does not constitute a tender
offer. Id.
134. Id. As a practical matter, when a bidder's intentions are generally
known, the bidder may not be able to deny the intentions. Id.
135. Kahn, F.3d at 116. The shareholders failed to allege facts showing that
VRS affirmed the information in the June 18, 1991 press release. Id. The joint
release must be affirmed in a subsequent editorial to constitute a tender offer. Id.
136. Id. For the pertinent text of Rule 10b-5, see supra note 4.
137. Kahn, 13 F.3d at 116. The Third Circuit held where an agreement in
principle has been reached, a duty to disclose exists. Staffin v. Greenberg, 672
F.2d 1196, 1207 (3d Cir. 1982). The Staffin court also upheld a finding of liability
when an insider intentionally suspended discussions that created a likelihood of
merger. Id. The Third Circuit reasoned that disclosure of preliminary merger
talks would do more harm than good, and would itself be misleading. Id. at 1206.
The Staffin court noted that the Senate Subcommittee focused on the relationship
between the tender offer price and the market price when analyzing this issue. Id.
(citing Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Securities of the Committee on Banking and
Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 72 (1967)). The Subcommittee noted that when
word of the offer is publicized, the stock price fluctuates toward the expected
tender price. Id. Thus, the primary inducement to shareholders, the offer by an-
other to purchase their shares at a premium, is lost. Id. The American Stock Ex-
change noted that corporate developments may produce material information
that is subject to rapid change. Id. at 1206-07. The Exchange concluded that suc-
cessive public announcements on the same subject with changing facts would con-
fuse and mislead the public. Id. For a detailed discussion of Staffin, see supra
notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
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significant to the reasonable investor's trading decisions.1 3 8 The Fourth
Circuit found that the holding of Basic Inc., which rejects the bright-line
"agreement in principle" test for preliminary merger negotiations, also ap-
plied to the RF&P restructuring.13 9
Finally, the Fourth Circuit found that the terms of the RF&P restruc-
turing would be important to a reasonable investor's trading decisions. 140
Nonetheless, the Fourth Circuit limited its holding to the appropriateness
of the June 18, 1991 disclosure regarding the restructuring.1 4 1 The court
established that the press release was not made on behalf of the bidder
because the June 18, 1991 press release related to a public announcement
required under RF&P's Rule 10b-5 disclosure duty.14 2 For these reasons,
138. Kahn, 13 F.3d at 116. The Supreme Court applied this materiality stan-
dard in TSC Industries v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976), by stating that an
"omitted fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable share-
holder would consider it important in deciding how to vote." TSC Indus., 426 U.S.
at 449. Likewise, the Court applied this standard in Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S.
224 (1988) by stating that "[w] e now expressly adopt the TSC Industries standard of
materiality for the § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 context." Basic Inc., 485 U.S. at 232.
The Supreme Court was cautious not to set a materiality standard that was too low,
noting that certain information regarding corporate developments might be of
dubious significance. Id., at 448. A minimal standard may result in an overabun-
dance of information causing management "simply to bury the shareholders in an
avalanche of trivial information ... a result that is hardly conducive to informed
decisionmaking." Id. at 448-49.
139. Kahn, 13 F.3d at 116-17. After an extensive study, the Advisory Commit-
tee on Corporate Disclosure cautioned the SEC against restricting materiality to a
strict formula. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 236 & n.14 (1988) (citing
House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Report of the Advisory Committee on
Corporate Disclosure to the Securities and Exchange Commission, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 327
(1977)). Although the Committee believed that absolute certainty in determining
materiality would be ideal, such a goal remains unrealistic in practice. Id. at 236
n.14. The materiality concept is judgement driven. Id. Thus, the Committee ad-
vised the SEC to avoid the pursuit of certainty and to continue examining material-
ity on a case-by-case basis. Id.
140. Kahn, 13 F.3d at 117. The Supreme Court identified a Second Circuit
case, which acknowledged that materiality should be determined on the particular
facts of the case, in stating:
[Slince a merger in which it is bought out is the most important event
that can occur in a small corporation's life, to wit, its death, we think that
inside information, as regards to a merger of this sort, can become mate-
rial at an earlier stage than would be the case as regards lesser transac-
tions ...and this even though the mortality rate of mergers in such
formative stages is doubtless high.
Basic Inc., 485 U.S. at 238 (citing SEC v. Geon Indus., Inc., 531 F.2d 39, 47-48 (2d
Cir. 1976)).
141. Kahn, 13 F.3d at 117. The court did not decide when the disclosure of
such negotiations would be required, because the court determined disclosure on
June 18, 1991 was appropriate. Id.
142. Id. The district court stated:
The SEC has expressly recognized that a company's disclosure obligations
may require that statements be made with respect to information con-
cerning the company, and it would create insurmountable conflicts for a
tender offer to be deemed commenced by virtue of such disclosure. The
SEC could also not impose conflicting regulatory requirements on com-
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the Fourth Circuit ultimately concluded that the RF&P press release was
not a public announcement commencing a tender offer under Rule 14d-
2(b). 1 4 3
IV. CONSISTENCY OF RESULT, BUT INADEQUACY OF REASON IN KAHN V.
VIRGINIA I TIhFREfMNVT SYSEMS
The Kahn court applied the fact intensive Basic Inc. materiality inquiry
to the subject transaction. 144 Although the Fourth Circuit's reasoning re-
mains incomplete, the pro-disclosure result supports a sound policy ration-
ale. 145 Additionally, the reasoning is consistent with the Basic Inc.
probability and magnitude analysis.'
46
panies- on the one hand, require public disclosure of a material event
such as a proposed tender offer and on the other, treat the required dis-
closure as the commencement of a tender offer which would thereby
cause other transactions by the company to violate the federal securities
laws.
Kahn v. Virginia Retirement Sys., 783 F. Supp. 266, 270 (E.D. Va. 1992), aff'd, 13
F.3d 110 (1993), cert denied, 114 S. Ct. 1834 (1994).
143. Kahn, 13 F.3d at 117. The Fourth Circuit noted that it was ill-advised to
include the statements of RF&P, VRS, and CSX in the press release. Id. Such
statements indicated that the release was joint and not made on behalf of VRS and
CSX. Id.
144. Id. at 116-17. Kahn involved a three-way transaction which resulted in a
stock sale and a corporate restructuring. Id. at 111-12. For further discussion of
the transaction and restructuring, see supra notes 96-108 and accompanying text.
145. Kahn, 13 F.3d at 116-17. The purpose of federal securities laws is to pro-
vide investors relevant information for informed decision-making. J. Robert
Brown, Jr., Corporate Communications and the Federal Securities Laws, 53 GEo. WASH. L.
REV. 741, 751 n.23 (1985). See generally Victor Brudney, A Note on Materiality and
Soft Information Under the Federal Securities Laws, 75 VA. L. REv. 723 (1989) (noting
that investors should not be denied relevant information in insider trading con-
text); Marc I. Steinberg & Robin M. Goldman, Issuer Affirmative Disclosure Obliga-
tions - An Analytical Framework for Merger Negotiations, Soft Information, and Bad News,
46 MD. L. REv. 923 (1987) (concluding that corporations should have duty to dis-
close bad news between periodic corporate reports); Jude Sullivan, Materiality of
Predictive Information After Basic: A Proposed Two-Part Test of Materiality, 1990 U. ILL.
L. REv. 207, 230 (1990) (concluding that SEC policy encourages disclosure of pre-
dictive information). Believing the worst abuses come from investor's lack of infor-
mation, Congress sought to remedy this problem via a scheme providing investors
with the information necessary to make informed decisions. Id. Congress repeat-
edly referred to the significance of disclosure when enacting the 1933 and 1934
Acts. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., at 11 (1934) (discussing
how true and accurate corporate reporting is critical in maintaining proper func-
tion of public exchanges); S. REP. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., at 1 (1933) (stating
that one aim of 1933 Act involves providing investors true and accurate
information).
146. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 238 (1988). To appraise take-
over probability, the Supreme Court recommended finding an indicia of interest
at the highest corporate levels. Id. at 239. Examples of such indicia include
"board resolutions, instructions to investment bankers and actual negotiations be-
tween principals or their intermediaries .... Id. However, the Supreme Court
did not intend for this list to be exhaustive. Id. Other courts have identified addi-
tional factors demonstrating the probability of a merger's occurrence. See, e.g.,
290 [Vol. 40: p. 263
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A. The Duty to Disclose
Rule 10b-5 cases traditionally begin with an analysis of whether a gen-
eral duty to disclose exists.147 Neitherjudicial nor statutory rules require
Taylor v. First Union Corp. of S.C., 857 F.2d 240, 244 (4th Cir. 1988) (holding
merger negotiations immaterial though two banks agreed in principle to merge
when interstate banking became legal), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1080 (1989); SEC v.
Fox, 855 F.2d 247, 251 (5th Cir. 1988) (endorsing materiality test based on "sub-
stantial certainty"); Rowe v. Maremont Corp., 850 F.2d 1226, 1229 (7th Cir. 1988)
(noting that potential acquirer had retained law firm specializing in acquisitions,
had hired brokerage firm to help acquire stock and had met with target executives
to discuss acquisition); Kronfeld v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 832 F.2d 726, 728-
30 (2d Cir. 1987) (noting that company retained investment bank to consider sell-
ing subsidiary and investment bank discussed sale with company executives without
board proposal), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1007 (1988); Flynn v. Bass Bros. Enter., 744
F.2d 978, 988 (3d Cir. 1984) (balancing information's potential aid against its po-
tential harm to investors when assessing materiality); SEC v. Shapiro, 494 F.2d 1301
(2d Cir. 1974) (noting that defendant purchased shares knowing that company's
president wanted to merge, that firms commenced merger discussions and that
director for other company had reacted favorably to merger).
When considering the magnitude of the transaction, the Supreme Court
noted that a possible merger is a momentous occurrence for any corporation. See
Basic Inc., 485 U.S. at 238. Nonetheless, information does not automatically be-
come material because it relates to a sale or a merger. See, e.g., Reiss v. Pan Am
World Airways, Inc., 711 F.2d 11, 13 (2d Cir. 1983) (stating that courts must view
claim that disclosure was required "in the light of the facts existing at the time of
the release") (quoting SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 863 (2d Cir.
1968)); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc)
(noting that duty to disclose material information exists only when disclosure is
reasonably certain to substantially impact market), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969);
In reGeneral Motors Class E Stock Buyout Sec. Litig., 694 F. Supp. 1119, 1128 (D.
Del. 1988) (balancing substantial impact of transaction with low probability of oc-
currence and concluding that information was not material under Rule lob-5).
147. Basic Inc., 485 U.S. at 239 n.17. See also Flamm v. Eberstadt, 814 F.2d
1169 (7th Cir. 1987) (concluding corporation has no duty to disclose ongoing
merger negotiations before analyzing materiality of such negotiations); Walker v.
Action Indus., Inc., 802 F.2d 703, 709 (4th Cir. 1986) (holding omissions from
press release not material because SEC has not imposed general duty to disclose
financial projections), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1065 (1987); Flynn, 774 F.2d at 988
(noting disclosure of material facts only required if duty to speak exists); Panter v.
Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir.) (recognizing that corporation has no
duty to disclose financial projections before assessing materiality of non-disclo-
sure), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981); Vaughn v. Teledyne, Inc., 628 F.2d 1214
(9th Cir. 1980) (recognizing no duty to disclose financial projections unless made
with reasonable certainty). Under federal securities laws, courts have no duty to
disclose material inside information or material corporate developments. See
Brown, supra note 145, at 750. Courts typically permit corporate management to
decide the timing and content of disclosure and view such redundant issues as an
internal corporate affair. See, e.g., Financial Indus. Fund, Inc. v. McDonnell Doug-
las Corp., 474 F.2d 514, 518 (10th Cir.) (holding that corporate directors and of-
ficers are not liable for mistakes resulting from events requiring exercise of
judgment, such as deciding when to disclose corporate information, where such
director or officer acts in good faith), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 874 (1973); Texas Gulf,
401 F.2d at 850 (stating that "the timing of the disclosure of material facts.., is a
matter for the business judgement of the corporate officers entrusted with the
management of the corporation").
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an issuer to disclose material information. 148 Nonetheless, a limited ex-
ception to this general non-disclosure rule requires publication of mate-
rial facts before a company trades in its own securities.' 4 9 The Fourth
Circuit's rationale in Kahn lacks completeness because the court fails to
identify the scope of RF&P's duty to disclose.150 However, the informa-
148. Basic Inc., 485 U.S. at 240 n.18. Articulated as follows, the "disclose or
abstain exception" constitutes the earliest exception to the general rule of non-
disclosure:
[I] nsiders must disclose material facts which are known to them by virtue
of their position but which are not known to persons with whom they
deal and which, if known, would affect their investment judgement. Fail-
ure to make disclosure in these circumstances constitutes a violation of
the anti-fraud provisions. If, on the other hand, disclosure prior to effect-
ing a purchase or sale would be improper or unrealistic under the cir-
cumstances, we believe the alternative is to forgo the transaction.
In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 911 (1961); see also Speed v. Transamerica
Corp., 71 F. Supp. 457, 458 (D. Del. 1947) (noting that plaintiff's allegation of
defendant's failure to disclose material fact was sufficient to defeat motion for
summary judgement). Despite the information's materiality, no liability arises
under Rule 10b-5 unless a duty exists to disclose it. Starkman v. Marathon Oil Co.,
772 F.2d 231, 238 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1015 (1986).
149. Roeder v. Alpha Indus., Inc., 814 F.2d 22 (1st Cir. 1987). Essentially, a
company cannot purchase or sell its stock without fully and completely disclosing
all material inside information. See, e.g., Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life &
Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971) (stating that courts should construe "sale"
broadly to effectuate purposes of 1934 Exchange Act); Rathborne v. Rathborne,
683 F.2d 914, 920 (5th Cir. 1982) (noting that courts have defined "purchase" and
"sale" broadly, to include transactions that do not resemble conventional common-
law purchases and sales); Alley v. Miramon, 614 F.2d 1372, 1380 (5th Cir. 1980)
(noting that term "sale" applies to individuals who may not be sellers in common-
law sense); Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307, 314-18 (6th Cir. 1976) (examining
"abstain or disclose rule" relating to insider trading), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1053
(1977); Swanson v. Wabash, 577 F. Supp. 1308, 1316-17 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (holding
that exchange of stock options for money constitutes purchase); Fisher v. Plessey
Co., 559 F. Supp. 442, 449 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (noting that corporation has greater
obligation to disclose during pendency of tender offer of its securities than for
normal business operations). Before insiders can trade, information must be dis-
closed "in a manner calculated to reach the securities market place in general
through recognized channels of distribution, and public investors must be af-
forded a reasonable waiting period to react to the information." In re Faberge Inc.,
45 S.E.C. 249, 255 (1973); see also Texas Gulf, 401 F.2d at 854 n.18 (stating that
"where the news is of a sort which is not readily translatable into investment action,
insiders may not take advantage of their advance opportunity to evaluate the infor-
mation by acting immediately upon dissemination"), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976
(1969). Beyond these general pronouncements, there has been little guidance on
how disclosure should be made or how long disclosure insiders must wait before
trading. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-4(f) (6) (1985) (requiring issuers to wait 10 busi-
ness days before repurchasing their shares following termination of tender offer).
The opinion rendered in Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983), provides a critique of
this absence of guidance. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 678 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (stating
that "Commission tells persons with inside information that they cannot trade on
that information unless they disclose; it refuses, however, to tell them how to dis-
close"); see also Texas Gulf, 401 F.2d at 854 n.18 (calling on Commission to provide
guidance for companies in determining proper timing of insider transactions).
150. See Kahn v. Virginia Retirement Sys., 13 F.3d 110, 116 (4th Cir. 1993),
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tion included in the June 18, 1991 press release triggered RF&P's duty to
disclose.1 51
B. Tender Offer
The Fourth Circuit concluded that RF&P'sJune 18, 1991 press release
did not constitute a tender offer, but failed to apply any of the conven-
cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1834 (1994). Before analyzing the materiality of the informa-
tion, plaintiff must allege a duty to disclose. See Basic Inc., 485 U.S. at 239 n.17
(noting "[s]ilence, absent a duty to disclose, is not misleading under Rule 10b-5").
The Fourth Circuit delves into a materiality analysis upon mentioning Rule 10b-5.
Kahn, 13 F.3d at 116. The court notes that merger and other like negotiations
must be disclosed at some time. Id. (citing Staffin v. Greenberg, 672 F.2d 1196 (3d
Cir. 1982)). Nevertheless, the court fails to identify RF&P's specific duty to dis-
close the transaction and restructuring information included in the June 18, 1991
press release. See id. at 116-17.
Requiring an inquiry into materiality, before identifying a duty to disclose, is
logically skewed. See Kenneth S. Fife, Mandatory Disclosure of Soft Information in the
Market for Corporate Control, 35 EMORY L.J. 213, 253 (1986) (concluding that disclo-
sure requirements cannot rest purely on "materiality"). The inquiry into material-
ity as an analytic matter and a conclusion that information is material cannot be
distinguished from the duty to disclose. Id. The duty does not arise unless that
information is material. See, e.g., Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228
(1980) (stating that "the duty to disclose arises when one party has information
that the other [party] is entitled to know because of a fiduciary or other similar
relation of trust and confidence between them") (quoting RESTATEMENT (SEcoND)
OF TORTS § 551 (2) (a) (1976)); Craftmatic Sec. Litig. v. Kraftsow, 890 F.2d 628, 640
& n.16 (3d Cir. 1989) (noting that statutes and regulations do not require corpo-
rate disclosure of all material information); Roeder, 814 F.2d at 22 (stating analyti-
cally material information need not always be disclosed).
The duty to disclose can arise at some point because developing events reach
a degree of relevance and reliability where the benefits of disclosure outweigh the
costs, even to a non-transacting party. Compare In re General Motors Class E Stock
Buyout Sec. Litig., 694 F. Supp. 1119, 1128-29 (D. Del. 1988) (holding no duty to
disclose exists, absent specific statutory, regulatory, or fiduciary duty, or rumors
that can be traced to company) with Flamm, 814 F.2d at 1174-78 (implying disclo-
sure of merger negotiations required when agreement in principle is reached).
151. Kahn, 13 F.3d at 112 & n.2. RF&P disclosed information relating to the
sale of their stock in the press release. Id. The SEC has characterized a sale as any
securities transaction requiring shareholders to make a new investment decision.
See 17 C.F.R. § 230.145 preliminary note (1985). The preliminary note states:
The thrust of the rule is that an "offer," "offer to sell," "offer for sale," or
"sale" [sic] occurs when there is submitted to security holders a plan or
agreement pursuant to which such holders are required to elect, on the
basis of what is in substance a new investment decision, whether to accept
a new or different security in exchange for their existing security.
Id. Courts have repeatedly held that corporate reorganizations involving the issu-
ance or redemption of stock, such as mergers, consolidations, exchanges and liqui-
dations, involve the purchase or sale of securities and thereby trigger a duty to
disclose. See, e.g., Bryan v. Brock & Blevins Co., 490 F.2d 563, 568 (5th Cir. 1974)
(merger); Swanson v. American Consumer Indus., 415 F.2d 1326, 1330 (7th Cir.
1969) (exchange); Mader v. Armel, 402 F.2d 158, 161 (6th Cir. 1968) (merger),
cert. denied, 394 U.S. 930 (1969); Susman v. Lincoln Am. Corp., 578 F. Supp. 1041,
1056 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (consolidation); Bolton v. Gramlich, 540 F. Supp. 822, 839
(S.D.N.Y. 1982) (liquidation). For a further discussion of this press release and its
pertinent text, see supra note 103 and accompanying text.
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tionaljudicial tests in reaching this conclusion. 152 The RF&P press release
met only two of the prongs included in the "Eight Factor" test l5 3 used by
several courts.1 54 Thus, application of the "Eight Factor" test to the RF&P
press release demonstrates that RF&P did not make a tender offer.1 5 5 Fur-
152. See Kahn, 13 F.3d at 114-16. These judicial tests include the "Eight Fac-
tor" test and the totality of circumstances test. See Weeden v. Continental Health
Affiliates, Inc., 713 F. Supp 396, 402-03 (N.D. Ga. 1989) (analyzing judicial tender
offer tests). For a further discussion of the "Eight Factor" test and the totality of
circumstances test, see supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text. The Fourth Cir-
cuit analyzed the RF&P press release in light of SEC Release 34-16623. Kahn, 13
F.3d at 115. Additionally, the court used case law cited by the plaintiff sharehold-
ers to refute their argument. Id. The plaintiffs argued that this press release con-
stituted a tender offer made by RF&P on behalf of VRS based on the Second
Circuit's decision in Field v. Trump. Id. The Fourth Circuit used the Field case to
support its holding. Id. For a detailed discussion of how the Fourth Circuit ana-
lyzed Field, see supra notes 126-30 and accompanying text.
Finally, the Fourth Circuit noted that classifying the June 18, 1991 press re-
lease as a tender offer detracts from the purpose of Rule 14d-2, which provides
bidders with certainty regarding potential tender offers. Id. at 116. For a detailed
discussion of the Fourth Circuit opinion, see supra notes 117-43 and accompanying
text.
153. For a list of the eight factors comprising the "Eight Factor" test, see supra
note 35. RF&P's press release did not constitute a solicitation to shareholders, but
was a proposal to the Board of Directors. Kahn, 13 F.3d at 112 n.2. Thus, the
release failed the first prong of the tender offer test. See Zuckerman v. Franz, 573
F. Supp. 351, 358 (S.D. Fla. 1983) (listing widespread shareholder participation as
first requirement). The press release met the second prong because the proposal
involved almost all of RF&P's outstanding shares of stock. Kahn, 13 F.3d at 113;
Zuckerman, 573 F. Supp. at 358 (requiring solicitation of substantial percentage of
stock to fulfill second prong). Similarly, the RF&P release satisfied the third prong
because the $39 proposed price included a premium over the $28 book value.
Kahn, 13 F.3d at 112-13 n.3; Zuckerman, 573 F. Supp. at 358 (requiring premium to
satisfy third prong). However, the Board of Directors had rejected several of the
Committee's previous restructuring recommendations. Kahn, 13 F.3d at 112.
Thus, because the terms were not firm, the press release failed to satisfy the fourth
prong. Id.; Zuckerman, 573 F. Supp. at 358 (requiring firm term to fulfill fourth
prong). Additionally, the press release failed the fifth, sixth and seventh prongs of
the test. Kahn, 13 F.3d at 112; Zuckerman, 573 F. Supp. at 358 (outlining fifth, sixth
and seventh prongs). The press release did not set a specific time limit on the $39
per share offer. Kahn, 13 F.3d at 112 n.2. Additionally, the transaction was not
contingent on the tender of a fixed number of shares. Id. Thus, no pressure was
exerted for the shareholders to make decisions. Id. Finally, a rapid accumulation
of RF&P stock did not follow the June 18, 1991 public announcement. Id. at 112-
13.
154. See, e.g., Zuckerman, 573 F. Supp. at 358 (noting that cash merger propo-
sal met factors and fell within tender offer definition); Hoover Co. v. Fuqua In-
dus., Inc., [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 97,107 (1979) (using
eight factors recommended by SEC to determine whether publication constituted
tender offer); Brascan Ltd. v. Edper Equities Ltd., 477 F. Supp. 773, 791-92
(S.D.N.Y. 1979) (specifying eight criteria to consider whether acquisitions consti-
tute tender offer under Williams Act); Wellman v. Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. 783
(S.D.N.Y. 1979) (applying "Eight Factor" test to determine existence of tender of-
fer), aff'd, 682 F.2d 355 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1069 (1983).
155. See Weeden, 713 F. Supp. at 402 (holding that letter offering to acquire
target corporation through merger or similar negotiated transaction did not com-
mence tender offer period). In a case where a letter to a targeted corporation's
[Vol. 40: p. 263
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ther, applying the "totality of circumstances" test 15 6 to the RF&P press re-
lease does not convert the June 18, 1991 public announcement into a
tender offer.15 7
C. Rule lOb-5 Analysis
In assessing the materiality of the press release, the actual negotia-
tions that occurred between the parties from 1986 to 1991 supported the
probability that the transaction would occur. 158 Additionally, because the
Special Committee members retained control over approval of the trans-
action, the probability of its occurrence was high. 159 Finally, the state is-
sued a budget directive, which became law in May, 1991, that was integral
in effectuating the three-way transaction. 160
The transaction's significance is evidenced by the separate committee
established to structure the transaction, and the disclosure of the specifics
board of directors met only prongs two and three of the "Eight Factor" test, the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia held that the
letter did not commence a tender offer. Id. In Kahn, the distribution of factors
met and factors failed is the same as Weeden. See Kahn, 13 F.3d at 112-14. Accord-
ingly, the result regarding tender offer status should also be the same.
156. 774 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1985).
157. See Kahn, 13 F.3d at 112-14. The circumstances surrounding RF&P's Spe-
cial Committee recommendation do not indicate that RF&P shareholders were
pressured into a hasty decision regarding their stock due to incomplete informa-
tion. Id. For a further discussion on the totality of circumstances test, see supra
note 36 and accompanying text.
158. See Kahn, 13 F.3d at 112 n.2. Between 1986 and 1991, the Committee
proposed and the Board rejected a sale, an asset exchange, a cashout merger and a
tender offer. Kahn, 783 F. Supp. at 267. These proposals and rejections reflect
negotiations between the Committee and Board. See Taylor v. First Union Corp. of
S.C., 857 F.2d 240 (4th Cir. 1988) (noting series of offers and counter-offers consti-
tutes actual negotiations). In Taylor, Southern offered to buy Bennie and Patricia
Taylor's (the Taylors) shares at the market price of $16 per share. Id. at 242. The
Taylors counter-offered with an offer of $18 per share. Id. Such counter-offer was
rejected by Southern, so the Taylors sold their shares to First Union at $18 per
share. Id. Similarly, in Kahn, each committee proposal is an offer and each board
decision is a rejection. See Kahn, 13 F.3d at 112.
159. See Kahn, 13 F.3d at 112. The Special Committee was comprised of voting
members of the RF&P Board of Directors. Id. In assessing the probability of a
merger, contingent events beyond the parties' control constitute relevant factors.
Taylor, 857 F.2d at 244. At the time First Union purchased the plaintiff's stock, the
Supreme Court had not ruled on the constitutionality of interstate banking and no
merger could take place until such legislation was enacted in both North Carolina
and South Carolina. Id. In Kahn, the proposed transaction did not hinge on con-
tingent events, thereby increasing the probability of the transaction occurring. See
Kahn, 13 F.3d at 112.
160. Kahn, 783 F. Supp. at 267. The directive involved VRS transferring $71
million to the Commonwealth for title to the 3.5 million shares of RF&P stock. Id.
at 268. This exercise of the Commonwealth's appreciation rights gave VRS free
and clear title to the RF&P shares. See id. Therefore, the transaction specified in
theJune 18, 1991 press release became more probable upon the budget directive's
approval. See id.
33
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of the transaction. 161 Based on the probability and magnitude analysis of
the June 18, 1991 press release, the information contained therein was
material and warranted disclosure under Rule lOb-5. 162
When scrutinizing these two conflicting SEC regulations, a decision
favoring information disclosure comports with the overall purpose under-
lying both Rule 10b-5 and the Williams Act.163 The Kahn decision in-
creases the quantity and improves the quality of corporate information
available to investors.1 64 The pro-disclosure outcome also facilitates an eq-
161. Kahn, 13 F.3d at 112. Many corporations frequently express the concern
of a possible acquisition, even though there are no concrete offers or specific dis-
cussions. Jacknovy v. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Fin. Corp., 873 F.2d 411, 415 (1st
Cir. 1989). Such evidence reveals nothing more than vague expressions of inter-
est. Id. As a result, any reasonably sophisticated securities investor buying shares
in a large corporation would expect that other corporations might express an in-
terest in buying shares. Id. Corporate directors might also be in a position to
address how to entertain such offers. Id. For large corporations to make public
announcements every time directors discuss vague merger interests or receive "ten-
tative feelers" would more likely confuse investors than inform the market. Id.
Nevertheless, the specific price and transactions highlighted in the June 18, 1991
press release raised the potential transaction beyond the speculative stage. See
Kahn, 13 F.3d at 112 & n.2. The transaction's magnitude is also evident because
the proposed transaction resulted in VRS owning substantially all of RF&P's stock.
Id. at 113.
162. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 723 F. Supp.
976, 987 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (noting that information readily accessible to public
weighs against finding of materiality and requiring disclosure). Potential knowl-
edge of the information by the shareholders at the time of the release remains a
factor to address, but is not allocated substantial weight. Id. As the Second Circuit
has noted: "There are serious limitations on a corporation's ability to charge its
stockholders with knowledge of information omitted from a document such as a
proxy statement or prospectus on the basis that the information is public knowl-
edge and otherwise available to them." Kronfield v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 832
F.2d 726, 736 (2d Cir. 1987) (citing Spielman v. General Host Corp., 538 F.2d 39,
40-41 (2d Cir. 1976) (per curiam)). The Supreme Court has stated that insider
trading can indicate materiality, but does not by itself establish materiality. Basic
Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 240 n.18 (1988).
163. Basic Inc., 485 U.S. at 240 n.17. For a detailed discussion of the pro-
disclosure philosophy of Rule 10b-5, see supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text.
For an analysis of the pro-disclosure philosophy of the Williams Act, see supra notes
9-12 and accompanying text.
164. See Kahn, 13 F.3d at 116-17 (requiring RF&P to disclose terms of corpo-
rate restructuring on date of press release). Pro-disclosure decisions facilitate in-
telligent investment decisions and promote the efficiency of the securities markets
in pricing securities and in allocating financial capital to real capital. See H.R. REP.
No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1934) (noting that hiding important information
obstructs operation of markets as indicators of real value); Allison G. Anderson,
The Disclosure Process in Federal Securities Regulation: A Brief Review, 25 HASTINGS LJ.
311, 353 (1974) (concluding that SEC's main task of providing useful information
outweighs goal of protecting unsophisticated investors); Brown, supra note 145, at
751 (noting that rule of non-disclosure conflicts with general purpose of federal
securities laws); Brudney, supra note 145, at 735 (stating important justification for
duty to disclose involves improving the amount and content of information avail-
able to investors); Victor Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders and Informational Advantages
Under the Federal Securities Laws, 93 HARv. L. REv. 322, 334 (1979) (noting that pur-
296
34
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 1 [1995], Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol40/iss1/6
1995] NOTE 297
uitable distribution of information among investors, and reduces the pos-
sibility that a few investors may yield large profits by trading on inside
information unavailable to others.165
V. THE X4HNDECISION'S FAILURE TO PROVIDE MUCH NEEDED GUIDANCE
TO BUSINESS LAWYERS
Although the Fourth Circuit's reasoning in Kahn appears incomplete,
the ultimate result supports the overall purpose of the SEC regulatory
scheme - full disclosure of material information. 166 The Kahn decision
pose of requiring disclosure under Rule 10b-5 involves creating an efficient infor-
mation flow and enabling investment decisions to reflect relevant market facts and
expectations); Sharon Sutter, Basic Inc. v. Levinson: The Standard for Materiality
Under Rule IOb-5, 21 U. TOL. L. REv. 290, 291 (1989) (emphasizing importance of
fair and free information exchange on market). Anotherjustification favoring dis-
closure is denying persons having exclusive access to certain kinds of information
an advantage over others with whom they transact, but cannot legally obtain the
same information. See Anderson, supra, at 353-67 (stating that disclosure obliga-
tions rest with persons possessing a lawful monopoly of material information).
165. See Brudney, supra note 145, at 735 (noting that desire to create fairness
between investors and attempt to increase quantity and improve quality of avail-
able corporate information are two primary justifications for duty to disclose infor-
mation relevant to stock price). Typically, information regarding significant
undisclosed corporate developments leaks to select individuals on the market, who
trade and profit from this exclusive information. See Brown, supra note 145, at 751.
A 1985 Business Week study examined the stock prices of 229 exchange listed com-
panies involved in mergers, takeovers or leveraged buyouts. Id. at 751 n.24 (citing
Laderman, The Epidemic of Insider Trading, Bus. WK., Apr. 29, 1985, at 78-79). The
study compared stock prices one month and one day prior to the transaction's
announcement to determine if information leaks increased stock prices. Id. The
study concluded that stock prices increased in 72% of the cases, 20% above the
market average of 52%. Id.; see also Jones, Rendleman & Latane, Earnings An-
nouncements: Pre-and-Post Responses, J. PORTFOLIO MGMT., Spring 1985, at 28, 31
(stating that results of study on impact that announcement of abnormal earnings
has on stock prices suggests that market adjusts before and on earnings announce-
ment days); Keown & Pinkerton, Merger Announcements and Insider Trading Activity:
An Empirical Investigation, 36J. FIN. 855, 866 (1981) (stating that study of daily stock
price movements indicate that pending merger announcements are not secret,
and trading on this information is common); Penman, Insider Trading and the Dis-
semination of Firm's Forecast Information, 55J. Bus. 479, 501 (1982) (concluding that
corporate insiders time trades depending on when firm releases earnings
prospects).
166. See Brown, supra note 145, at 751. The drafters of the Securities and
Exchange Act sought to protect the integrity of the securities market by encourag-
ing fair and free information exchange. Sutter, supra note 164, at 291. Only if
market participants have access to the same accurate information can market in-
tegrity be sustained. Id. Such disclosure requirements, derived from the general
anti-fraud provisions of the 1934 Act, require disclosure of material information
either expressly or implicitly.
The 1934 Act remains unclear on whether either Rule 10b-5(2), which refers
to material information, or 10b-5(3), which does not make reference to material-
ity, prohibit "mere silence." See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833,
848 (2d Cir. 1968) (stating that investor's duty to disclose is limited to "those situa-
tions which are essentially extraordinary in nature and which are reasonably cer-
tain to have a substantial effect on the market price of the security if [the
35
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demonstrates that the principles of timely disclosure and materiality which
govern preliminary merger cases apply equally to other contingent corpo-
rate developments. 167 The Fourth Circuit's holding, however, remains
narrow and fails to establish a clear rule specifying when business negotia-
tions become material.1 68
As illustrated by Kahn's generally accepted tests, a direct approach to
determine the scope and timing of a corporate board of directors' affirma-
tive disclosure duties does not appear to exist. 169 Instead, the Supreme
Court has examined numerous factors, including the text of section 10(b)
and Rule lOb-5, the legislative history of section 10(b) and the Exchange
Act, common-law principles of fraud, and SEC interpretations of Section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5. 170
extraordinary situation is] disclosed"), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); In re Cady,
Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961) (noting implicit requirement to disclose mate-
rial information).
167. See Kahn, 13 F.3d at 116-17. Other contingent corporate developments
include internal estimates of a corporation's future performance (i.e. projections
of earnings, revenues, sales, or stock prices) which if disclosed would relieve the
investor of the need to rely solely upon his or her own inferences about future
company performance. Brudney, supra note 145, at 723 n.2 (discussing types of
"soft" or "future oriented" information). Additionally, information that estimates
the present value of non-liquid assets providing the public investor with expert
inferences, drawn from internal corporate information, constitutes another con-
tingent corporate development. Id. Finally, information about potential merger
negotiations is referred to as "soft" and indicates a contingent corporate event's
occurrence. Id. Unlike the internal corporate estimates, information regarding
potential merger negotiations does not embody any expert estimates about the
likelihood that contingent events will occur. Id. As a result, such information is
similar to a statement of back orders or of accrued depreciation or expenditures
made on research and development, reflecting corporate estimates of contingent
events but not estimating the quantitative impact on market price. Id. The various
reasons for distinguishing between merger negotiations and other kinds of infor-
mation concern the unusual and discrete character of a merger, the probable and
significant impact on the price of securities, and the wholly contingent character.
Id.
168. Kahn, 13 F.3d at 117. In holding that theJune 18, 1991 press release did
not constitute a tender offer, the Kahn court stated that "[w] e do not decide when
the disclosure of such negotiations was required, because we are of the opinion
that the disclosure of them at the time of the press release was appropriate to meet
the disclosure requirements of the Exchange Act." Id. As a result, the decision is
limited to the precise facts of Kahn and the June 18, 1991 press release. Id.
169. Robert H. Rosenblum, An Issuer's Duty Under Rule 1Ob-5 to Correct and Up-
date Materially Misleading Statements, 40 CATH. U. L. REv. 289, 296 (1991) (noting
that no direct approach exists for establishing a corporate board of directors' af-
firmative duty to disclose).
170. See, e.g., Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 226-29 (1980) (finding
that under both common law and SEC interpretations of section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5, insiders have duty to disclose material, nonpublic corporate information
prior to trading); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 212-14 (1976) (con-
cluding that administrative history and plain language of section 10(b) are disposi-
tive of appropriate standard of liability); cf. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 660-63
(1983) (relying in part on SEC Commissioner's concurring opinion in administra-
tive decision). The Chiarella Court, for example, considered some of these sources
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Justice Blackmun criticized the SEC's lack of guidance in his dissent-
ing opinion in Dirks v. SEC. 171 Justice Blackmun noted that although the
SEC forbids trading on undisclosed, inside information, it does not in-
struct investors on how or when to disclose such information. 172 The Sec-
ond Circuit also requested that the SEC provide instruction on when
corporations should disclose insider transactions.173
Based on the lack of legislative or judicial guidance on when to dis-
close business negotiations, if a corporation has any doubt concerning the
negotiations' materiality, it should disclose the required information. 174
Additionally, corporate management must develop procedures assuring
that corporate personnel, familiar with the current state of public informa-
tion, pre-approve all insider trades. 175 Corporations should also establish
securities law compliance programs to ensure the complete, accurate and
in concluding that a duty to disclose material, nonpublic information prior to trad-
ing stems from the fiduciary relationship between corporate insiders and corpo-
rate shareholders. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 226-30. The Court noted that neither the
legislative history nor language of section 10(b) discussed this potential duty. Id. at
226. The Court has also specified other considerations such as "longstanding ac-
ceptance by the courts [of a reasonable interpretation of section 10(b)], coupled
with Congress' failure to reject [that interpretation] .... argues significantly in
favor of [its] acceptance." Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723,
733 (1975). The Court also considers "what may be described as policy considera-
tions when we come to flesh out the portions of the law with respect to which
neither the congressional enactment nor the administrative regulations offer con-
clusive guidance." Id. at 737.
171. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 678 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
172. Id. at 678 n.17 (Blackmun,J., dissenting). In the oral argument, the SEC
alleged that even if Dirks reported the information to the SEC, his disclosure obli-
gation would remain unsatisfied. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). This position
would conflict with a safe harbor rule allowing investors to trade a fixed period
after disclosing the inside information to the SEC. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Because this safe harbor or a similar rule describing how to disclose inside infor-
mation do not exist, insiders must refrain from trading. See In re Faberge, 45 S.E.C.
249, 256 (1973) (finding that disclosure requires public release through public
media designed to reach investing public generally).
173. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 854 n.18 (2d Cir. 1968).
The court called upon the SEC to use its rule-making power to "provide some
predictability of certainty for the business community." Id.
174. Committee on Corporate Laws, Corporate Director's Guidebook - 1994 Edi-
tion, 49 A.BA. Bus. LAw. 1247, 1276 (1994). Insider trading law violations trigger
significant sanctions. Id. The violator's liability includes profits earned or losses
avoided. Id. A court may also assess a treble damage (three times the earned prof-
its or avoided losses) penalty or criminal sanctions against the insider trader. Id.
175. Id. These procedures may require directors to contact corporate coun-
sel, the chief financial officer, or the corporate secretary before trading. Id. The
NYSE-Listed Company Manual suggests restricting insider trading to fixed periods
following disclosure of quarterly and annual financial results. Id. Many corpora-
tions, rather than create safe harbor periods, prohibit insiders from trading their
corporate securities for the two to three weeks preceding the release of quarterly
financial statements. Id.
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timely disclosure of material information.1 76 Nevertheless, absent clear
standards of when a duty to disclose arises or when a transaction becomes
material, even carefully structured insider trading procedures or compli-
ance programs will not consistently satisfy Rule 10b-5.
The premise underlying securities law and securities regulation in-
volves a free market with investors making choices from fully disclosed
material facts.17 7 Through full disclosure and complete information, the
market will efficiently incorporate all data and set a market price. 178
Based on the significance of materiality in the federal regulation schemes,
coupled with the lack of guidance from the Commission, courts interpret-
ing the materiality of a corporate transaction should aggressively fashion a
legal framework specifying when a corporation must disclose the subject
transaction.
The Kahn decision does not provide any guidance for corporations
seeking to avoid early disclosure of significant corporate transactions. 179
Did the February 1991 Virginia budget directive, which approved the sale
of Virginia's appreciation rights on 3.5 million restricted RF&P shares,
trigger RF&P's duty to disclose their corporate restructuring?18 0 Or did
this duty to disclose arise when the governor approved the budget direc-
tive in May, 1991? The Fourth Circuit failed to answer the underlying
question of when Rule 10b-5 required RF&P to disclose their negotiations
with CSX and VRS. 18 1 As a result, the opinion ultimately contributes to
the lack of much needed instruction faced by corporate boards of direc-
tors and business lawyers attempting to avoid early disclosure of merger
negotiations or other large corporate developments.
Henry L. "Scott" Nearing, III
176. Id. at 1279. These programs also aid compliance with insider trading
laws. Id. A well-designed and administered compliance program may also help
satisfy a director's due diligence obligations under the securities laws. Id.
177. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 246 (1987). The incentive for inves-
tors to monitor corporate disclosures reflects their motivation to make money, not
their attempt to sustain a cause of action under Rule 10b-5. Id. at 246 n.23. Con-
gress does not need to dismantle the federal, mandatory disclosure scheme to rec-
oncile investor market reliance with their expectations. Id.
178. Id. at 246-47. Market professionals generally consider most publicly an-
nounced material statements regarding companies. Id. at 246-47 n.24. Therefore,
such statements directly impact stock market prices. Id. One court noted "it is
hard to imagine that there ever is a buyer or seller who does not rely on market
integrity. Who would knowingly roll the dice in a crooked crap game?" Id. at 248.(quoting Schlanger v. Four-Phase Sys. Inc., 555 F. Supp. 535, 538 (S.D.N.Y. 1982)).
179. Kahn v. Virginia Retirement Sys., 13 F.3d 110, 117 (4th Cir. 1993), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 1834 (1994). For a detailed discussion of this narrow holding, see
supra note 168 and accompanying text.
180. For details regarding this three-part restructuring, see supra notes 105-08
and accompanying text.
181. Kahn, 13 F.3d at 117.
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